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INTRODUCTION TO MILLER'S CAREER 
J. Hillis Miller's contribution to the field of literary studies is considerable. He 
received his undergraduate degree from Oberlin College, earned. his Ph.D. from 
Harvard, served as English Department chair at Yale and Johns Hopkins 
Universities, acted as president of the Modem Language Association, and is 
currently the Distinguished Critic of Comparative Literature at University of 
California at Berkeley. Moreover, his career typifies, incorporates, and participates 
in the radical changes in English departments, the IIredrawing" of the ''boundaries'' 
of the literary field in the post-structuralist era. A study of his 16 books and 
numerous articles reveals a move from a phenomenologist "criticism of 
consciousness," to a post-structuralist brand of "deconstruction" which Miller aligns 
With "close, rhetorical reading," and, in his most recent work, to a defense of his 
emphasis on reading in a field which emphasizes reading less and less. 
Miller begins his career as a phenomenologist at Johns Hopkins University 
where he seeks a unified authorial presence in Charles Dickens: The World of His 
Novels (1959), The Disappearance of God (1963) and Poets of Reality (1965). In the mid 
1960s, Miller makes a post-structuralist break as he begins to explore the 
implications of an always already figurative language in The Fonn of Victorian Fiction 
(1%9) and Thomas Hardy: Distance and Desire (1970). His work in the 1970s (primarily 
journal articles) attempts to reconcile phenomenology with deconstruction by re-
allocating authority to the text. As he comes to recognize that meaning is unstable 
and chaotic, Miller's attention to the rhetorical elements of text allows him to 
"narrate" a text's heterogeneity and corresponding unreadability. In Fiction and 
Repetition (1982) and The Linguistic Moment (1985), Miller pursues a connection 
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between metaphysics, language, and literature, concluding that metaphysics resides 
only as a linguistic trope and that literature is "a search for [metaphysical] 
grounding" or a "testing of the ground." Criticism is always a demonstration of the 
way a text "deconstructs" itself. With the publication of The Ethics of Reading, (1986) 
and Versions of Pygmalion (1991), Miller explores the metaphysical implication of 
reading, plays with the relationships among language, narrative, and ethics, and 
concludes that ethics, and by extension any metaphysical category, cannot be 
separated from reading. In his most recent book-length publications, Ariadne's 
Thread (1992) and Illustration (1992), Miller refocuses his critical attention on the field 
of literary studies itself and develops a post-structuralist, close, rhetorical reading of 
reading and/or criticism in its own right. 
Miller's dissertation, which was published in 1959 as Charles Dickens and the 
World of His Novels, looks closely at Dickens' narrative structure. Miller sees an 
important correlation between form, which he understands as narrative structure, 
and the underlying consciousness of the author. His study is both rhetorical and 
thematic; indeed, it seems particularly concerned with showing how the two are 
necessarily intertwined, how they are derived from, and dependent on, one 
another. His study focuses on the Dickensean theme of the search for identity, but, 
by ordering his chapters chronologically, Miller attempts to trace the development 
of Dickens' literary imagination, his "cogito." In his chapter on The Pickwick Papers, 
for example, he reveals the connection between Dickens' use of an editorial voice 
and its corresponding objective detachment on the one hand, and a "comic view of 
things" on the other (2). Even early in his career, then, Miller exhibits his 
commitment to the study of narrative structure and "close, rhetorical reading." 
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In The Disappearance of God (1963), Miller explores the thematic and narrative 
implications of a Victorian ideology inherited from the Romantics which accepts a 
subject/ object dichotomy. Because writers appropriate and embrace the 
subject/ object division, Miller reasons, they are no longer able to experience God as 
both "immanent and transcendent," who can consequently be experienced only as 
an absence. He describes the "romantic project" as creating "through [the 
romanitcs's] own efforts a marvelous harmony of words which will integrate man, 
nature, and God" (14); in seeking harmony, however, they necessarily acknowledge 
disconnection. Dichotomy creates disconnection, and this disconnection is reflected 
in the thematic and narrative aspects of Romantic and Victorian literature, in De 
Quincey, Browning, Emily Bronte, Arnold, and Hopkins. Miller assumes that the 
text reflects the authorial consciousness, is an embodiment of an ideological 
structure which, in this case, is the outward manifestation of an inner experience of 
isolation and "spiritual poverty." The writers he discusses "all attempt, like the 
romantics, to bring God back to earth as a benign power inherent in the self, in 
nature, and in the human community" (15). 
Like Disappearance, Miller's Poets of Reality (1965) explores the implications of a 
dualistic ideology. In this case, however, he understands Modernist texts as 
constructed in confrontation with a dualistic, subject/object ideology. In contrast to 
the dichotomy he identifies as Romantic and Victorian in Disappearance, Miller 
identifies a Modernist ideology of connection: ''In the new art these depths tend to 
disappear. The space of separation is turned inside-out, so that elements once 
dispersed are gathered together in a new region of copresence" (9). Everything is 
object and everything is subject. Important to this ideological shift, Miller reasons, is 
Conrad's recognition of the connection between imperialism and the subject/object 
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dichotomy. He is convinced that Conrad's narratives "play out" the subject/object 
dichotomy to its logical conclusion and mark the beginning of the modernist 
aesthetic of connection as reflected in Yeats, Eliot, Thomas, Stevens, and Williams. 
As he does in Disappearance, in Poets Miller identifies an authorial cogito reflected in 
the thematic and narrative textual elements, makes historical generalizations, and 
seeks a totalizing, structuralist conception of an authorial consciousness. 
The Form of Victorian Fiction (1969) is a compilation of a series of lectures given 
at Notre Dame University in 1967. This study reflects the gradual shift which has 
been appearing in his articles from privileging thematic to privileging rhetorical 
textual elements, that is privileging not the external but rather the "inner structuring 
principles of a work" (xi) which precede rather than reflect authorial consciousness. 
Form builds on the "disappearance of god" concept by exploring its ontological, in 
addition to its epistemological, implications. In his four chapters which look at a 
wide range of Victorian authors, Miller represents narrative time, intersubjectivity, 
and realism as derived from, in fact as embodiments of, one another. The 
prevalence of an omniscient narrator, for example, is both like and unlike a god: it is 
all-knowing but limited by a Victorian ideology which necessarily embodies human 
limits in experiencing time and in figuring interpersonal relations. Again, the text is 
a reflection of the author in that the interaction between self and community is 
embodied in the interaction of narrator and characters which, in turn, reflects back 
on the author's cogito. But the questions Miller pushes are more ontological than 
epistemological, more rhetorical than thematic. 
Thomas Hardy: Distance and Desire (1970) explores the "outlining [thematic] 
threads" of distance and desire across Hardy's literary and poetic texts. Distance is a 
struggle with language in its recognition that neither critic nor author can reach an 
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"extra-linguistic origin" nor "escape from labyrinthine wanderings within the 
complexities of relationship among words" (vii). Though Miller is still concerned 
with a ''Hardy Cogito," he is skeptical about his ability to represent it as "origin" 
and recognizes the inevitability of "an endless interpretative process of deferred 
meaning" (xi). He does necessarily identify a thematic mode of existence which 
struggles to reconcile distance and desire, but he stops short of treating it as a "fixed 
celestial archetype of which each particular is an incarnation" (xi). Thus, just as 
Hardy's texts attempt to negotiate between the contradictory themes of distance 
and desire, Millers too attempts to be paradoxically distant and close, ontological 
and epistemological. 
After Distance Miller did not publish any book-length works until 1982 when 
he published Fiction and Repetition (1982). Those twelve years, however were 
extremely productive times, where, in numerous journal articles, he worked out his 
post-structuralist theories about close, rhetorical reading and unreadability, and 
came to embrace complexity and heterogeneity; indeed, much of his later book-
length publications are elaborations on essays produced from 1970-1982. 
As he tells us in Fiction and Repetition, Miller's guiding principle of literary 
investigation is to be true to its "strangeness": 
[T]he specificity and strangeness of literature, the capacity of each 
work to surprise the reader, if he can remain prepared to be 
surprised, means that literature continually exceeds any formulas 
or any theory with which the critic is prepared to encompass it 
(5). 
As a sort of manifesto against theory per se, Millers celebration of, and surrender 
to,literary "strangeness," as well as his corresponding emphasis on close, rhetorical 
reading derive from seeing language as figurative rather than representative. 
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Miller's most important paradigm shift is understanding language as always already 
figurative and literature as a necessarily conscious "playing with" or "deconstruction 
of" the figurative nature of language. This comes to have important implications for 
how he defines his role as a literary critic who "reveals how a text deconstructs 
itself." 
In his first book-length deconstructive work Fiction and Repetition (1982), 
Miller shows how Modernist novels present a deconstruction of realism. His 
interpretations of Lord Jim, Wuthering Heights, Henry Esmond, Tess of the D'Urbervilles, 
The Well-Beloved, Mrs. Dalloway, and Between the Acts are simply examples of loosing 
himself of the notion that meaning is "outside the words" and considering the 
implications of it being "within them" (141). Each interpretation is an example of a 
post-structuralist, rhetorical reading, each appropriate and derived from the text. 
Ultimately, Miller's emphasis on "repetition" does not "ground" the texts in a 
totalizing conception. He does not, in other words, use the novels to prove that all 
novels use repetition to create meaning. In fact, his definition of "repetition" is 
sometimes troublesome and often sounds closer to "figuration" or "signification." 
In his chapter on repetition he theorizes that meaning is often generated by 
repetition of contiguous and similar elements, rather than through any sort of 
traditionallogocentric epistemology. That is, the repetitions present in a text are 
constructed against linearity, as elements which undermine logocentrism and 
thereby attempt to bring the reader to a world outside of, but necessarily always 
inside, the figurative web. Repetitions assert and deny authority, origin, meaning, 
and epistemologic grounding; they "vibrate among various possible configurations, 
since there is not a solid base on which to construct a definitive interpretation" (l09). 
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As Miller explores in Repetition, the deconstruction of realism depends on the 
denial of linguistic mimesis; language can not be a transparent medium for 
communicating meaning. In his next book-length publication, The Linguistic 
Moment: From Wordsworth to Stevens (1985), he concludes that literature is essentially 
meta-semiotic. The most important moments in literature are those which 
acknowledge and exemplify the semiotic nature of language, those '1inguistic 
moments" where "texts reflect or comment on their own medium" (xiv). These 
moments, presumably, are "in one way or another a search for a ground within, 
beneath, above, before, or after time, something that will support time, encompass 
it, still its movement" (xvi). Linguistic typifies the brand of deconstructive criticism 
Miller advocates, which ironically grounds his emphatic denial of any 
epistemological grounding. Criticism should be the "repeating of the work of 
criticism already present in the poems themselves, that self-testing-as of a man 
jumping up and down on a plank over an abyss" (xviii). 
In The Ethics of Reading: Kant, de Man, Eliot, Trollope, James, and Benjamin (1987), 
Miller explores the notion that ethics exist beyond epistemology and, by extension, 
exist only in a "performative" rather than a "constative" state. Language is 
endlessly referential, even in seemingly mimetic ethical discussions. In his 
discussions of "ethical parables," Miller explores the connection between the 
unattainable other, in this case "ethics," and storytelling. ''Narrative,'' he writes, 
"like analogy, is inserted into that blank place where the presumed purely 
conceptual language or philosophy fails or is missing" (24). Building on his devotion 
to "literary strangeness" and his notion that reading is an act against logocentrism, 
Miller concludes that ethics do not exist without storytelling. The story, that is, 
functions as a parabolic catachresis for the ethical premise. Ethics are not derived 
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from "thematic dramatizations of ethical topics" but from the performance of them. 
The meta-semiotic, '1inguistic/ ethical moment" demonstrates the necessary 
connection between narrative and ethics; like language, ethics are endlessly 
referential and unverifiable. That is, a narrative which thematically treats ethics does 
not address ethics directly, but is rather an exploration of the ontological and 
performative nature of them. Reading, by extension, must have an ethical 
dimension in addition to its cognitive and epistemological ones. In reading a James 
narrative, one might question the ethical basis on which it stands. But reading is 
always already ethics, is always performative in the sense that it creates an ethical 
moment which, in turn, makes something else happen. The relationship, however, 
is not exactly causal because one defines ethics as they happen. They don't exist, in 
other words, without application. 
In a continuation of Ethics, Versions of Pygmalion (1990), Miller explores the 
implications of his notion that ethics are essentially and necessarily connected to 
narrative. Like Pygmalion, readers must give life to the inanimate characters they 
are confronted with in a simultaneously constative and performative act which 
avoids epistemological grounding. Readers, writers, critics, and teachers must take 
responsibility for this act; the stories they choose are about characters whose actions 
reflect their process of understanding the story. That is, if ethics are indeed derived 
only from the performance of a particular text, Miller reasons, the text which is 
chosen will have important ethical implications. In his readings of What Maisie Knew, 
Kliest's ''Der Findling," "Bartleby the Scrivener," Blanchot's L' arret de mort, and 
James' "The Last of the Valerii," Miller explores not the thematic representation of 
ethical issues within a work, but the ethical issues involved in the act of reading itself 
(17). 
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Both Ethics and Pygmalion use a "reading act" theory which understands 
reading as neither solely cognitive, nor solely political, nor solely social, nor solely 
interpersonal, and understands literature as not just an effect but also a cause. 
Reading derives a subversive power from suspended disbelief, a refusal to 
recognize the parabolic and/ or catachrestic nature of language, and, most 
importantly, from an ignorance of the "performative power" of each reading act. 
The connection between ethics and storytelling bodes well for the social and political 
importance of English departments in the general sense, and close, rhetorical 
reading in the specific sense: ''It there is not ethics without story and not story 
without prosopopoeia, then understanding that figure of speech is essential to an 
understanding of ethics and especially of the ethics of reading" (Pygmalion 13). Ethics 
and Pygmalion, then, are forums for Miller to show the political, ethical, and social 
utility of deconstruction, of attending to the rhetoric's literary, or any textual, 
"strangeness." 
Though less directly "useful," Miller's two collections of literary essays, 
Tropes, Parables, and Performatives (1990) and Victorian Subjects (1990), amass his best 
efforts in rhetorical reading, each "entered history at a specific moment" and each is 
"the memorial record of a discrete event of reading, not a stage in some 
predetermined itinerary fulfilling a single 'research project''' (vii). Undermining 
Miller's emphasis of the separateness of each reading act is his consistent denial of 
epistemological certitude. Each reading is a testimony to the veiled "other" which 
exists only parabolically and is derived only from the performance of close 
rhetorical reading. 
Narrative is a central feature of Miller's work in its implications and its 
applications. His critical pieces in both Tropes and Victorian Subjects are historical 
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accounts of his readings; he narrates the story of his reading process. He tells how a 
particular text forces him to read, where that reading act effects a response, and how 
it ultimately and necessarily ends in a constructive bafflement, parabolically close to 
the unattainable "other." His texts, like the literary texts he studies, are stories 
about continually striving and inevitably failing to reach the "other/' are stories 
about the nothingness of existence: they are without a clear origin or governing 
telos, and they merely are ''links in a chain" striving for "gradual clarification." In 
his essay on Heart of Darkness from Tropes, he places himself next to Marlow as 
"another witness in my turn, as much guilty as any other in the line of witnesses of 
covering over while claiming to illuminate. My Aufklarung too has been of the 
continuing impenetrability of Conrad's Heart of Darkness." (193). 
In his book-length contribution to the Bucknell Series in Literary Theory, 
Hawthorne and History: Defacing It (1991), Miller uses a close, rhetorical reading of 
'The Minister's Black Veil" [MBV] to further collapse the distinction between realism 
and allegory. That is, central to Miller's deconstructive reading of MBV is the sense 
that language is semiotically self-referential, within a closed system of signs, and 
therefore meaning is clearly different from and opposed to experience. In the essay, 
he concludes that the text is a parabolic example of the impossibility of unveiling, of 
the impossibility of escaping the symbolic realm. In the process, he remains 
fundamentally self-conscious about the "tools" he uses for understanding the text 
and collapses the traditional chasms between paradigmatic sets of binary opposites: 
history and literature, realism and allegory, veiling and unveiling, and, ultimately, 
reading and theory. 
In his collection of theoretical essays, Theory Now and Then (1991), Miller 
further collapses the distinction between reading and theory. Though the collection 
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amasses his important theoretical essays from his "criticism of consciousness" era to 
his "deconstructive" era, the title is a pun, referring less to the progressive sense of 
theory "back then" as opposed to now, and more to the parsimonious sense that 
theory is needed or occurs "only now and then" to help one to read. Like ethics, 
theory exists only in its performance and is an aid to the reading process. "Theory," 
he writes, "is nothing without the praxis and that reading is, the praxis that theory 
makes possible, though theory and reading are asymmetrical" (xi). Indeed, Miller's 
"theoretical" essays are less theories per se than they are theories about theories, 
looking at the uses and limits of theories and continually emphasizing the practical 
rather than epistemological utility of their developments. Theory is the reader's 
disposition which makes the cognitive aspects of reading possible. Finally, theory is 
both the most and least important aspect of Miller's career. Most important because 
his, along with Derrida's and de Man's, wedding of post-structuralist notions of 
unreadability with the New Critical loyalty to the text create new vigor for close, 
rhetorical reading. Least important because it is only a means to the important end: 
the reading of a text. 
In his most recent scholarship, Miller has turned his close, rhetorical reading 
in on itself. In his "Ariadne Project," which begins with his 1978 essay, "Ariadne's 
Thread: Repetition and the Narrative Line," and grows into Ariadne's Thread (1992) 
and Illustration (1992), Miller reads the reading process,looking at the implications of 
the always already figurative language which critics and readers use to understand 
works of art. Indeed, any "understanding" of narrative is, as Miller continually 
shows in Ariadne, itself a narrative, which reaches, in turn, only a parabolic 
clarification. Essentially, Ariadne exposes the etymologically hidden assumptions 
implicit in narrative terminology: '1ine," "character," "anastomosis," and "figure." 
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Like narrative itself, the terms used to describe narrative are labyrinthine. Because 
they too find themselves in the figurative woods, he concludes that narrative 
fortifies itself with ''line imagery" which, in turn, fortifies itself with the concepts of 
causality and logocentrism. Narrative is the figurative veil which allows us to 
"forget" that our alienated existence lies in the inescapable labyrinth of figure. 
"Narrative," he concludes, "is the allegorizing along a temporal line of the perpetual 
displacement from immediacy" (257). 
In Illustration Miller explores the critical implications for the figurative 
labyrinth, specifically the theoretical implications for the growing "cultural 
criticism." The book is broken into two sections, the first, ''The Work of Cultural 
Criticism in the Age of Digital Reproduction," is a general investigation of cultural 
studies, and the second, 'Word and Image," is an "illustration" of his reading of 
various illustrations. Essentially Miller argues that cultural studies shoots itself in the 
foot when it relies on theory as mimesis rather than signification. In other words, 
he argues against studying artworks as "illustrations" of presupposed theoretical 
"texts." like "words and images," theory and artworks are necessarily juxtaposed 
and do not "mean" the same thing. Instead, Miller argues that criticism can be both 
practical and political if it is a performative reading which recognizes difference and 
is, in turn, ''historical'' and "inaugural," as bringing something hitherto unheard of 
into the world" (55). Reading should be an identification of difference which 
j'changes the society into which it enters, makes it, in however minute a way, begin 
again" (56). 
In the second chapter of Illustration, Miller looks at Dickens' relationship with 
his illustrator Hablot K. Browne (''Phiz'') and J. M. W. Turner's impressionistic 
paintings to "illustrate" his loyalty to semiology, concluding that image and text 
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perform in essentially the same way, and, are necessarily juxtaposed signs. Again, 
representation is not representation in the mimetic sense but in the semiotic sense. 
Word and text are "echoes" of one another. He attends to the "irreducible 
heterogeneity of works of art," figurative signs, rather than mimetic 
representations, of their historical economic, technological, class, and gender 
contexts of the works" (151). 
The irony of Miller's career is that the more he becomes entrenched in the 
post-structuralist territory, the more resistant he becomes to theory per se. For 
Miller, theory is only as helpful as its ability to aid in the reading process, but, as I 
will explore in chapters three and four, reading itself is a slippery, metaphysical 
category. Before exploring the metaphysical implications of reading, however, it is 
necessary to understand Miller's theoretical movement from structuralism to post-
structuralism, or specifically his movement from phenomenology to deconstruction. 
Consistent with Miller's emphasis on narrative, Chapter 2 is a story which 
emphasizes certain "theoretical moments" and ignores others. My central goal in 
chapter 2, however, is not to be historically accurate, but to use specific historical 
instances to point parabolically to general theoretical direction. 
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THEOREITCALDEVELOPNrnNT 
Criticism of consciousness was for me only a momentarily 
successful strategy for containing rhetorical disruptions of 
narrative logic through a dialectic method in criticism. Such 
criticism exerted that control by a constant reference back to the 
continuities of authorial consciousness as origin, end, and 
underlying logos of literature. My turn to the rhetoric of 
literature in Fiction and Repetition and the Ariadne project 
was ... [a] return to an indigenous, abiding fascination with local 
linguistic anomalies in literature (Ariadne xv). 
Miller was a physics major for his first two undergraduate years at Oberlin 
and, as a phenomenologist, his criticism is certainly an exacting science, dissecting 
the text to find the author, the essential element which, though it may formally 
differ from text to text (body to body,) is functionally the same and always present. 
But, as the introductory quote attests, Miller would have one believe that he has 
abandoned the scientific control in his gradual movement from structuralism to 
post-structuralism, phenomenology to deconstruction. His deconstructive emphasis 
on "close, rhetorical reading" clearly marks a return to the text guided only by an 
"indigenous, abiding fascination with local linguistic anomalies in literature." 
As I state in chapter 1, Miller began his career as a phenomenologist, or "critic 
of consciousness," and, in the late 1960s, shifted his critical paradigm to become a 
deconstructive critic who emphasized "close, rhetorical reading." Each of Miller's 
critical pieces clearly states its critical presuppositions, what and how it's trying to 
achieve. His theoretical shift, its continuities and revisions, then, is well-documented 
across his career. Though all his essays consistently contain an element of meta-
criticism, his publishing focus seems to move from more overtly critical essays to 
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more overtly theoretical essays. Because Miller's emphasis on rhetorics is a 
controversial stance in the contemperary literary environment which is trying 
harder and harder to make itself politically and socially useful and/ or productive, he 
is forced to continually defend his critical paradigms. Critical or meta-critical, 
Miller's essays are consistently practical and are always focused on important 
metaphysical issues about reading and criticism. Whether or not one agrees with 
Miller's philosophical infrastructure or the practicality of his critical paradigms, one 
cannot argue his commitment to the field of literary studies. 
In the course of his theoretical development, Miller's most important 
paradigm shift is derived from the notion that language is a closed semiotic system 
built around difference and reference. He abandons the notion that language is 
mimetic and constative, and acknowledges that language is always already 
figurative, that words are signs alienated from the reality they endeavor to 
represent, and that words are signifiers which signify only other signifiers. 
As a phenomenologist, Miller relied on the notion that signification permitted 
him access to the lIother," an objectifiable authorial cogito. He is convinced that the 
lIobject" of any literary study is to articulate the "entirely independent" mind of the 
author as it is exposed in the literary text. In The Disappearance of God (1%3), Miller 
writes, 
The comprehension of literature takes place through a constant 
narrowing and expansion of the focus of attention, from the 
single work of an author, to the whole body of his works, to the 
spirit of the age, and back again in a contraction and dilation 
which is the living motion of interpretation (vii). 
This ''living motion" of interpretation is actually quite static, moving vertically in the 
context for the construction of a text. The critic attempts to identify a telos and/or 
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origin for a literary text and, by extension, to fixate it as an outward manifestation of 
an inner consciousness, a mimetic representation of a personal ideology; the critic 
"understands" (rather than stands next to) the text by restaging the milieu for its 
production, pinpointed as authorial cogito. 
In his first published article, ''The Creation of the Self in Gerard Manley 
Hopkins" (1955), Miller describes a text as a place where "the world of sense 
perception has been transformed, through its verbalization, into the very substance 
of thought, and, one may say, into the very substance of Hopkins himself" (293). 
Here Miller uses a sort of conduit metaphor for language wherein the author 
contains the "substance" of meaning in words, reflects an inner consciousness 
through a "verbalization" process. Through some sort of mystical substitution, the 
text ''becomes'' the author. The alienation implicit in signification is not 
acknowledged: language allows the authorial consciousness to be perfectly mirrored 
in the text and, further, critical language allows the critic to empirically demonstrate 
the continuities between author and text. Language is representative and mimetic, 
not, as he comes to believe later in his post-structuralist writing, always already 
figurative. 
Even in his earliest essays, however, it's clear that Miller is uneasy about 
signification. His identification of an authorial cogito in a text is focused on trying to 
figure out how it got there and how a reader can recognize it. In other words, he 
becomes interested in identifying what and how a text signifies. In ''Franz Kafka 
and the Metaphysics of Alienation" (1957), he writes, 
They [Kafka's stories] are not symbolic, but perfectly literal 
embodiments of his inner life. They are the very form his 
consciousness takes when it has any form at all, when it ceases 
17 
to be a hollow shell filled with indeterminate energies careening 
in the void (296). 
Understanding Kafka's stories as '1iteral embodiments of his inner life" is dearly 
dependent on a structuralist notion of linguistic mimesis. But behind that 
structuralist notion, Miller is grappling with some important linguistic, 
epistemological, and ontological questions. This passage acknowledges the presence 
of signification in the creative process. He represents consciousness as alternately 
form and formlessness, and, by extension, defines form as determined and 
formlessness as "indeterminate." This dichotomy points to a general recognition of 
the enigmatic power of signification, to the deconstructive notion that the author 
must contain consciousness or "meaning" within pre-determined linguistic signs. 
The "void" which Miller briefly attests to in the Kafka passage becomes the focus of 
his later deconstructive study, the unattainable "other" which he ambitiously 
pursues in spite of, but paradoxically in accordance with, his best epistemological 
and logocentric judgment. 
In addition to, and certainly connected to, his changing notions about 
linguistic representation, Miller comes also to question the critic's ability to account 
for the creative processes involved with the production of a text. To say that a text 
consciously or unconsciously reflects an authorial cogito, is to assume that such a 
cogito exists apart from language. Phenomenological criticism is faithful to the 
New Critical notion that a unified authorial presence exists, a "profound harmony" 
among passages and between complete works, "a unity in which a thousand paths 
radiate from the same center" (Dickens ix). As a result, it is explicitly focused on the 
author rather than on the text; indeed, the work becomes a means for 
understanding the author: ''It is the embodiment in words of a certain very special 
way of experiencing the world" (Dickens ix). In his first meta-critical piece, "The 
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Literary Criticism of Georges Poulet" (1963), Miller describes the critic of 
consciousness as a "disinterested" observer: 'The re-creation of the mind of the 
author in the mind of the critic is not performed for the sake of any selfish good it 
may do the critic, but entirely for the sake of the author criticized" (473). 
Indeed, Poulet's brand of criticism served as an important model for Miller in 
the years they worked together at Johns Hopkins. In his article, Miller praises 
Poulet's loyalty to the authorial cogito, his insistence on structuring the authorial 
consciousness on its own terms. The critic articulates "the quality of the other mind 
in its purest form, not as it is modified by one content or another, but as it exists in 
itself." (480). The assumption here is that the author's mind has a subjective 
detachment, that it can be translated to an objective text, and that a critic can 
recapture that pure subjectivism. But, as Miller comes to realize, the subjectivity of 
the author and the objectivity of the critic are inevitably antithetical. In other words, 
criticism is inevitably and paradoxically opposed to reading in a Poulet model. In 
addition, from the retrospective point of 1991, Miller recognizes that even Poulet 
was conflicted by signification: "Poulet came to recognize, almost in spite of himself, 
the constative role of language in shaping consciousness if not actually making it" 
(Victorian Subjects viii). 
Miller's confidence in a "unified authorial consciousness" is replaced by a 
confidence in heterogeneity. As Miller glimpses into the post-structuralist abyss, he 
recognizes the futility of his desire to re-construct a "criticism of consciousness" and 
to achieve complete identification with the authorial cogito. In his introductory 
paragraph to ''Hopkins,'' Miller writes, 
One of its [criticism of consciousness'] chief limitations is the 
necessity of describing discursively and seriatim what is really 
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the non-temporal interior world of Hopkins, the total context in 
which any single poem exists and has its real meaning (292). 
In accounting for the phenomenal factors of a text's production, Miller comes to 
realize the infinitely heterogeneous variables which must be contained. In Dickens 
he writes, "A good novel, like the real world, must be less an organic whole than a 
collection of disparate parts which resists all our attempts to reconstitute it into a 
unity" (23). Even in his initial quests for a totalizing conception of an authorial 
consciousness, then, Miller begins to recognize the impossibility of homogeneity in 
narrative form. Paradoxically, Miller wants to simultaneously be loyal to and 
contain literary complexity. Complexity is that attribute of language which Miller 
does not want to lose and reading must be fundamentally opposed to logocentrism: 
My argument is that the best readings will be the ones which 
best account for the heterogeneity of the text, its presentation of 
a definite group of possible meanings which are systematically 
interconnected, determined by the text, but logically 
incompatible. The clear and rational expression of such a 
system of meanings is difficult, perhaps impossible (Fiction and 
Repetition 51). 
An interpretation without complexity will be vulnerable to be itself deconstructed, 
but complexity is inherently antithetical to his logo centric and epistemological 
ambitions. Even with an infinite heterogeneity, a text must still say something, and 
there must be limits to what a critic can say about a text because the critic must say 
something. Central to his later criticism is the notion of "unreadability," which 
claims that though a text offers many interpretative choices, it may be ultimately 
undecidable in meaning. 
A recognition of the figurative nature of language, then, eventually leads to 
Miller's confidence that the goal of a reader is to come to the point of unread ability, 
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a double blind, a paradoxical recognition of paradox. In liThe Figure in the Carpet" 
and "A 'Buchstabliches' reading of The Elective Affinities" (1979), for example, Miller 
reveals stories which exemplify his "linguistic moment" by allegorizing the 
paradoxical insistence and denial of completeness, continuity, and form. 
For Miller, literature is catachrestic, the naming "in figure, by a violent, 
forced, and abusive transfer, something else for which there is no literal name and 
therefore, within convention of the referentiality which the story as a realistic novel 
accepts, no existence" (''Figure in the Carpet" 111) .. He describes "all realistic 
narrative [as] 'unreadable,' undecidable, irreducible to any single unequivocal 
interpretation" (111). Put simply, the meaning of a text is not simply itself, is not 
even itself at all; rather, the meaning of a text is that which only the text acts as a 
catachresis for. It would be spurious to say that a text represents something because 
the presence of the text points to the impossibility of representing the "other:" 
''Unread ability' is something intrinsic to the words of a work, an effect of the 
rhetoric or of the play of figure, concept, and narrative in the work, an effect the 
words of the work impose on the reader, not an effect of reader response" (''Figure 
in the Carpet" 113). In "Character in the Novel" (1981), Miller goes so far as to 
suggest that fiction is always an allegory of the inevitability of misreading, a 
seemingly nihilistic performative which is actually an apotropaic denial of itself: ''It is 
a throwing away of what is already thrown away in order to save it. It is a 
destroying of the already destroyed in order to preserve the illusion that it is still 
intact" (282). 
If the text is a substitution, a forced filling of an epistemological void, then the 
critic is inevitably confronted with "unreadability." For Miller, the critic should not 
try to be outside of the text. He wants to push a schematic hypothesis lito the point 
21 
where it fails to hypothecate the full accounting for the novel which is demanded in 
the critical contacf' (Fiction and Repetition 63). Ultimately, anything epistemologically 
satisfying has not been pushed far enough and is not at all critically satisfying to 
Miller. He is satisfied only when he is not satisfied. All criticism must be 
deconstructed so that the text alone remains the original deconstructing force, the 
elusive, unreadable and ~decidable force. Deconstruction is a way of keeping a 
text in a constant state of flux, refusing to give it any metaphysical grounding by 
revealing its always already figurative nature. Therein lies the crux of his split with 
the Geneva school: "A metaphysical method of literary study assumes that literature 
is in one way or another referential, in one way or another grounded in something 
outside language" ("On Edge" 101). Miller's work often seeks the central paradox in 
each work, the point where logocentrism simply no longer works as a prevailing 
structure. His criticism exposes paradox and relocates it as a centralizing metaphor 
for the work. The parad<?x points metonymically to the "other" which, presumably, 
close, rhetorical reading exposes but does not objectify. 
Concurrent with his recognition that language is figurative rather than 
mimetic and that texts are infinitely heterogeneous, is Miller's shift in critical focus 
from a study in thematics, as is especially evident in Dickens and the "Dickensean 
search for identity," to a study in the rhetorics of narrative as begins to evidence 
itself in Distance and Desire. It is much easier to account for an authorial cogitio as it 
is represented in thematic elements than one as it is represented in rhetorical 
elements. The former presumes a mimetic critical language; the latter paradoxically 
necessitates a critical point of reference outside of language. In other words, Miller 
moves from focusing on the meaning of a text as is represented by the thematic 
elements to an investigation of how that meaning is rhetorically constructed. This 
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meta-reading is much different from the "pure identification" he aligns himself with 
earlier because he tries to take an external point of reference. For example, in 
Dickens, Miller describes his approach as: 
to assess the specific quality of Dickens' imagination in the 
totality of his work, to identify what persists throughout all the 
swarming multiplicity of his novels as a view of the world 
which is unique and the same, and to trace the development of 
this vision of things from one novel to another throughout the 
chronological span of his career (viii). 
In exploring Dickens' "view of the world," his "vision of things," Miller focuses 
more on the objectified "world" and "things" than the "view" and "vision." That is, 
he focuses more on the thematic than the rhetorical elements in Dickens' novels. On 
the other hand, in his essay on Mrs. Dalloway, ''Virginia Woolf's All Souls' Day: The 
Omniscient Narrator in Mrs. Dalloway" (1970), he writes, ''The most important 
themes of a given novel are likely to lie not in anything which is said abstractly, but 
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in significances generated by the way in which the story is told" (101). 
This shift from thematics to rhetoric is important because it allows him to 
retain some loyalty to a "criticism of consciousness." But the overwhelming 
heterogeneity of figurative elements coupled with the influx of the post-structuralist 
writings of Jaques Derrida and Paul de Man make a strong argument for linguistic 
entrapment in an always already figurative world, meaning constructed along 
linguistic difference, and a denial of te1os. By abandoning a teleological focus of 
authorial consciousness, Miller frees himself to look at, and be objectively loyal to, 
what he calls '1iterary strangeness." 
Miller's two 1966 meta-critical articles, ''The Geneva School" and ''The 
Antitheses of Criticism: Reflections on the Yale Colloquium," reveal the 
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paradigmatic connection between signification and "close, rhetorical reading." Like 
the dualism/monism progression he represents in the movement from Victorian to 
Romantic to Modernist literature, Miller recognizes that the figurative nature of 
language necessitates a monistic theory of literary criticism. He comes to recognize 
the irreducability of a text and shows he falls firmly on the new monism with the 
"insistence that a work of art means itself, rather than 'representing' anything" and 
that criticism too should do the same (567). A literary text must, by his definition, be 
irreducible, unsignifiable, and infinitely heterogeneous, yet the critical desire is to 
reduce, signify, and contain it. The "literary strangeness," which Miller wants to 
remain loyal to, must remain untainted by his epistemological desires. 
In his most recent meta-critical work, Miller comes to question the terms 
which govern the epistemological aspects of his critical paradigm. In his most 
ambitious essay on narrative lines, "Ariadne's Thread: Repetition and the Narrative 
Line" (1976), Miller points to the labyrinthine quality of narrative terms. Because 
they too find themselves in the figurative woods, he concludes the logocentric basis 
of the line imagery fortifies itself with the concept of causality and, more 
importantly, schematizes the way that critics understand literature: ''This principle 
holds the whole line together, gives it its law, controls its progressive extension, 
curving or straight, with some arche, telos, or ground" (158). Though the critic seems 
to reduce and achieve a telos, she is in fact using an equally figurative language for 
an equally catachrestic enterprise: 
[T]he notions of 'example' and 'line of investigation,' moreover, 
are not unequivocal or logically transparent concepts on which 
my enterprise can be solidly based. Both are, in fact, figures, 
with all the uncertainty or equivocation that always attends any 
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effort of thought based on figure (''Nature and the Linguistic 
Moment" 441). 
Miller's career, then, reveals a growing discomfort with language and leads to the 
conclusion that texts are ultimately unreadable because they are always already 
figurative representations. Even when his '1ine of investigation" is meta-critical, 
he's fundamentally skeptical about signification. He attempts to keep the literary 
texts from being grounded by denying his critical terms any metaphysical 
grounding. However, if the "other" is as allusive for critical authors as it is for 
literary authors, how can criticism expect to say anything about any literary text? 
From his tenure as a phenomenologist to the present, Miller attempts to resolve the 
critical "double-blind" by an allegiance to close, rhetorical reading. 
As different as Miller's theoretical presuppositions are from his earlier to his 
later career, his actual works of criticism look uncannily similar. In his collection of 
essays on Victorian literature, Victorian Subjects (1990), Miller points to the 
continuity in his theoretical development. There is not a "clear-cut shift", Miller 
explains, because his phenomenological "criticism of consciousness" relied on 
citation, "ironic displacement through citational miming" which is "already an 
implicit critique" and whose repetition is a "fundamental part of the strategy of so-
called deconstruction" (viii). More importantly, the "asymmetry between theory 
and reading" derives from a loyalty to the texts rather than to the theoretical, 
totalizing presuppositions. Miller's emphasis on reading, either for a constative 
authorial cogito or a perforinative confrontation with unread ability, is the important 
continuity among his various paradigms. Indeed, it is reading which allows him to 
move from phenomenology to deconstruction relatively unscathed. 
As a phenomenologist, an emphasis on reading allows Miller to remain 
faithful to both the author and his critical interests. He places "the act of 
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reading ... prior to any criticism" e'Poulet" 471). Reading here is a sort of complete, 
"pure identification" of reader with author: "The plunge into a book is achieved 
only in the perfect coincidence of the reader's mind with the 'intimate indescribable' 
of the author's mind." (''Poulet'' 471). Reading is "not yet criticism"; criticism 
reflects back on the reading process as "the putting in order and clarification of the 
identification attained through reading" (''Poulet'' 475). The idea of reading in 
"perfect coincidence" with the author's mind, however, is problematic and 
paradoxical when one moves from reading to criticism. The criticism of 
consciousness strives to "participate" in the text, to mirror and enhance the 
phenomenal experience of reading with the goal of revealing an authorial cogito. 
The phenomenological goal of reading, in other words, is to reach an identification 
or overlap of authorial and reader cogito, but that can paradoxically only happen on 
the author's own terms. Reading and criticism are antithetical because one is 
explicitly ontological and the other explicitly epistemological, a seemingly 
irreconcilable conflict is instrumental in his shift from a study of thematics to a study 
of rhetorics. 
The movement away from authorial cogito to rhetorics re-centers textual 
origin, an emphasis on the generative rhetorics, the "specific shaping energy which 
generates form and meaning" as he describes it in "Three Problems of Fictional 
Form" (1968) (48). But by identifying origin, Miller again finds himself in the 
epistemology / ontology dilemma: if the only access a critic has to an authorial cogito 
is the literary text, how does a reader actually gain access to the authorial mind 
without objectifying it? How can it be simultaneously experienced and articulated? 
One move Miller makes in the face of this double blind, is to move the 
reading process from outside to inside the text. He asserts the importance of what 
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he calls the '1inguistic moment," "the moment when language as such, the means of 
representation in literature, becomes problematic, something to be interrogated, 
explored, or thematized in itself" (''Linguistic Moment" 450). It is the meta-linguistic 
or meta-rhetorical moment which allows the deconstructor to participate with, 
rather than objectively explicate, the authorial cogito because both critic and author 
understand '1anguage not" as a mere instrument for expressing something that 
could exist without it, but as in one way or another creative, inaugurating, 
constitutive" and the "rejection of unitary origin" (450). The important reading 
process is, in other words, not reader reading text, but character reading signifier 
(which the reader, in turn, reads.) In The Form of Victorian Fiction (1968), Miller writes 
that the expression of a particular authorial consciousness, the cogito, is "mediated" 
and "indirect." ''It is to be approached only by way of the interaction of the 
imaginary minds of the narrator and his characters as they are related within the 
horizon opened by time in the novel" (2). Much of his later criticism deals both 
thematically and rhetorically with signification, or, as he explicitly deals with in The 
Linguistic Moment, his criticism is a demonstration of how literary works are 
themselves about signification, unreadability, and the unattainable "other." In this 
model, the critic's job is not to talk about her own reading process, but to talk about 
the characters' and narrator's, which are themselves metaphysical investigations of 
signification. From a deconstructive standpoint, then, reading allows the only access 
to the "other" found only in the textual interplay, and, by extension, language is a 
performative rather than constative device. The deconstructive emphasis on the 
ontological experience of rigorous reading is reminiscent of Poulet's emphasis on 
reading as "prior to any act of consciousness." From a phenomenological 
standpoint, reading allows the only access to the authorial consciousness, and, by 
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extension language is constative only through its performance. The major 
difference between the phenomenological and deconstructive reading paradigms is 
that the former uses reading to reach an endpoint and the latter can paradoxically 
and necessarily never reach any. 
Indeed, as Miller travels further into the deconstructive woods, the 
distinctions between literature, criticism and reading become less and less distinct. 
Just as criticism seems to participate in the "specific shaping energy" of literary texts, 
literary texts contain "self-interpretative elements" and thereby participate in their 
own critical reception. In ''The Interpretation of Lord Jim" (1970), Miller writes, ''The 
critic must enter into the text follow its threads as they weave in and out, appearing 
and disappearing, crisscrossing with other threads" (211). To represent the "shaping 
energy" of his own criticism, he uses the image from Heart of Darkness of Marlow's 
"yarns," whose meaning: 
was not inside like a kernel but outside, enveloping the tale 
which brought it out only as a glow brings out a haze, in the 
likeness of one of those misty halos that sometimes are made 
visible by the spectral illumination of moonshine (212). 
That image, which simultaneously exists and doesn't exist, whose materiality 
continually undermines itself as light and light reflection, which can only reach 
deeper into the paradoxical substance of haziness, seems to represent the difficulty 
Miller finds with objectifying a text. There is no kernel of objective reality to 
represent meaning. Meaning must be instantaneous and engaged with the text: 
Whenever the interpreter thinks he has reached back to 
something original, behind which it is impossible to go, he finds 
himself face to face with something which is already an 
interpretation, that is, something which refers to another sign 
still further back, and so on forever (213). 
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H language is always already figurative, signs can refer only to other signs in an 
infinite signifying slide of meaning, and, perhaps more importantly, the meaning of 
a sign is only itself. His reliance on Conrad's metaphor is an ironic reversal of 
criticism and literature. Conrad recognizes, predicts, or foreruns a deconstructive 
paradigm for reading, thus further hopelessly intertwining literature and criticism. 
Miller, in fact, repeatedly claims that a critic's job is not to deconstruct a text, but 
rather to show how a text deconstructs itself. 
H a critical piece is objective, logocentric, and epistemological, it is alienated 
from the text. H, on the other hand, a critical piece is subjective, uncanny, and 
ontological, it mystically ''becomes'' the text and will inevitably come under scrutiny 
for presuming to be ''literary'' in its own right. Reading is the middle ground 
between criticism and literature, a "performative catachresis" which imposes a 
meaning "that can never be encountered face-to-face" (Ariadne 210). Similarly, 
theory is "performative praxis," which guides the reading process but has no 
epistemological value in itself, is "there to help us get on with the serious business of 
reading" (vii). Theory exists only in the act of reading and reading is necessarily 
guided by theory, but the two are hopelessly antithetical. Theory is epistemological; 
reading is ontological-theory is constative; reading is performative. 
One way Miller deals with the literature/ criticism dichotomy is to use his 
criticism to talk directly about the reading process and, perhaps more aesthetically 
pleasing, to demonstrate, like a narrative, his own reading, entering it into history. 
The importance of narrative which Miller identifies in any fictive voice becomes 
catachrestically his own critical voice. In "Ariadne's Thread: Repetition and the 
Narrative Line," narrative catachrestically fills an important ideological void. 
''Narrative is the allegorizing along a temporal line of the perpetual displacement 
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from immediacy" (158). Allegory in this sense, however, is precisely the expression 
of the impossibility of expressing unequivocally, and so dominating, what is meant 
by experience or writing. Because a critic cannot escape the maze of figurative 
language, cannot arti~ate an "arche, telos, or ground," she must strive to reach a 
"double blind" which deconstructs her own undertaking as a critic and interpreter: 
"Criticism of a given novel or body of novels should therefore be the following of 
one or another track until it reaches, in the text, one or another of these double 
blinds, rather than the attempt to find some presupposed unity" (162). 
In the Lord Jim essay Miller describes the motion of criticism as a "weaving 
movement of advance and retreat [which] constitutes and sustains the 'meaning' of 
the text, that evasive center which is everywhere and nowhere in the play of its 
~anguage" (227). The Derridean notion that language is "free play" (play in the 
sense of the play of a steering wheel) has important implications for Miller's critical 
paradigm. In ''The Still Heart: Poetic Form in Wordsworth" (1971), Miller captures 
the ontological spirit of deconstructive thought: "Meaning is generated by the 
interplay of elements rather than by the copying of some pre-existing sense "(298). 
''Play'' denies the existence of origin or telos; meaning comes from the ontological 
rather than epistemological elements of language. Aligning linguistic free play with 
textual signification allows Miller to account for the uncanny '1iterary strangeness" 
without objectifying it and by experiencing it as a ontological rather than 
epistemological phenomenon. 
Miller, then, makes some important claims about criticism. Criticism should 
be focused on the figurative nature of language, and deconstruction is the "playing 
out" of linguistic possibilities, a teasing out of meaning which, in itself, is often the 
meaning. In a strong sense, Miller's criticism is parabolic, itself a figurative 
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representation which never quite reaches the "other' outside language but points 
allegorically to its existence. Miller and authors alike play with the indeterminate 
nature of language and its corresponding relation to a presupposed objective reality. 
But such a view, it has been argued, isolates a text from the "real world" and is 
devoid of any social or political utility. 
The redrawing of the literary boundaries seems to have relegated close 
reading to a less than primary position. This, Miller feels, is a significant growing 
pain: ''That the profession is nothing if it is not philology, the love of words, the 
teaching of reading, and the attempt in written criticism to facilitate the act of 
reading" (Fiction and Repetition 21). In his most recent work, Miller has been less 
involved in criticism per se and, ironically, more involved with preaching the 
importance of close, rhetorical reading. Again it is not "the free invention of new 
conceptual or historical schemes" but the close reading which advances literary 
study ("Search for Grounds" 28). For Miller, theory should be secondary to reading. 
Theory is generalization, and generalizations do not fit because they cover up and 
ground the fundamental strangeness of literature which he wants so badly to 
preserve. The only possible ground for literature is language, which itself is 
ungrounded, unmeaning, and undecidable, and figurative. Criticism, like literature, 
must then be the "testing of the grounding of language in this or that particular text, 
not in the abstract or in abstraction from any particular case" (31). This does not 
mean that critical and literary authors do the same thing, but it means that they are 
after the same unattainable "other." 
Indeed, Miller treads on philosophically unstable "ground." Primarily, he 
negotiates between the antitheses of literature and criticism, subjectivity and 
objectivity, ontology and epistemology by narratizing historical accounts of his own 
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close, rhetorical readings. His largest challenge, then, is to make his brand of 
literary criticism socially and politically productive. In defense of the practicality of 
deconstruction, Miller's "Ethics Project," The Ethics of Reading and Versions of 
Pygmalion, examines the metaphysics of reading and unites the antithesis of 
pragmatics and aesthetics by exposing essential connections between them; they are 
always already dependent on one another. As a metaphysical investigation of 
reading, the ''Ethics Project" defines reading as a simultaneously constative and 
performative state for which the reader must take responsibility. As I will explore in 
the final two chapters, this definition has important implications for both the socio-
political and aesthetic expectations for literary studies. 
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THE "Enncs PROJECT' 
[T]here is a necessary ethical moment in the act of reading as 
such, a moment neither cognitive, nor political, nor social, nor 
interpersonal, but properly and independently ethical (Ethics 1). 
As is explored in Chapter 2, Miller's criticism remains consistently focused on 
reading. But with his post-structuralist recognition of the always already figurative 
nature of language, Miller begins to grapple with the metaphysical implications of 
reading an endlessly referential language. Does reading understand, translate, 
interpret, conceive, deduce, or induce? In his two volume "ethics project," Miller 
attempts to account for the material effects of reading--specifically, how is reading a 
performative which makes something happen in the physical world. The Ethics of 
Reading, (1987) queries how the metaphysical category of ethics is derived from 
reading, and Versions of Pygmalion (1990) grapples with the ethical dimensions of 
narrative. Both function as sub-categories of the larger investigation of the 
metaphysics of reading. By exploring the connection between reading, a narrative 
imperative, and the "ethical moment," Miller diminishes the distinction between the 
dichotomies of language and action, constatives and performatives, metaphysics 
and the material world, and epistemology and ontology. 
For Miller, the "ethical moment" is a response in two directions-the moral 
imperative (''1 must") and the ethical act, the "doing;" both are responses to the 
slippery metaphysical category of ethics. Essentially Miller separates ethics from 
politics and cognition, defining it as a source rather than a subordinate (4-5). The 
key to understanding Miller's theory is to think of ethics not as a reference to a 
preexistent moral imperative defining right or wrong, good or bad. Rather, Miller 
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thinks of ethics as existing only in their application, the self-imposed imperatives 
that continually guide our actions and reactions but cannot be confronted directly. 
The theoretical framework for Miller's investigation of reading and narrative is that 
ethics are, like any semiotic system, ungrounded, endlessly referential, and, by 
extension, essentially performative. Miller's deconstruction of ethics explores how 
moral imperatives are derived from reading. 
Essentially, Ethics explores the connection between the act of reading and the 
ethical moment as a way of looking at the connection between a categorical 
imperative and a performative. The "ethical moment" in reading exists not in 
reference to any transcendent moral law but as a performative (/'1 promise"), a self-
imposed, ungrounded, decision which is always inaugural and only self-referential. 
The reading, performance/writing, re-reading and subsequent re-performance/re-
writing create an infinitely ungrounded chain of infinitely ungrounded ethical 
moments, perpetually deferred from immediacy in its retrospective narrative cloak. 
The moral imperative, in other words, is neither moral nor linguistic, but a 
categorical imperative derived from the words on the page. It is the semiotic 
equivalent of the signifier which refers only to other signifiers, infinitely deferred, 
referential, and ungrounded. As a performative, then, an ethical response is a 
response to a self-imposed categorical imperative-rather than a response to some 
transcendent moral law. Indeed the "of" in "ethics of reading" is not a constative 
response to the thematic content, but a performative response to the categorical 
imperative to respond. Miller pursues the nature of that allusive categorical 
imperative in both Ethics and Pygmalion, though he never quite captures it, 
concluding that it exists in that allusive category of "other" which always is out of 
the reach of human cognitive abilities. 
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In Ethics Miller looks at examples of authors reading themselves, those texts 
where Kant, de Man, Trollope, Eliot, James, and Benjamin confront the ethical 
dimensions of their texts. By choosing authors reading themselves, Miller is able to 
contrast ethical intention with actual ethical interaction; the authors act as guinea 
pigs for their own signifying intentions. That is, the authors he reads read 
themselves armed with the metaphysical presupposition that their texts will 
IItransmit" an ethical imperative in a certain way. In his chapter on Kant, ''Reading 
Telling," Miller uses a passage from Kant's Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten to 
deconstruct Kant's validation of a transcendent moral or ethical law. In the passage 
Miller examines, Kant uses a footnote to defend his claim for IIrespect" in his theory 
that identifies duty to a law as determined by pure respect, "the consciousness or 
the submission of [a] will." But as Miller demonstrates, Kant finds it impossible to 
isolate "respect," paradoxically defining it as lIan object neither of inclination nor of 
fear, though it has something analogous to both." Respect, then, is paradoxically 
both like and not like inclination and fear, is itself a moral or ethical imperative 
which eludes the metaphysical grounding Kant wants to subject it to, and, by 
extension, exists only in the performative ethical moment. The performative 
moment of "respect" functions paradoxically as both response and origin; 
adherence to the law is paradoxically a self-imposed necessity generated by the 
moral imperative for respect ("I must"), the subject's submitting "as if" the law were 
universal. 
In his deconstruction of Kant's footnote, then, Miller demonstrates that 
Kant's description of the ethical moment is itself metaphysically ungrounded. The 
moral law is by Miller's definition "forever inaccessible" and can be confronted 
directly only in its ultimately irreducible performative moments. And IIrespect" for 
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the moral law, Miller extrapolates, exists only in its performance and can be 
abstracted only in the form of a performative, which itself can neither abstract nor 
be abstracted. The ethical performative is metaphysically impenetrable and 
therefore functions as a catachresis for some unarticulatible "other," the moral law 
itself, which exists only in its manifestation in the political, social, and/or cognitive 
world. Further, it must be articulated as a narrative. That is, because access to the 
moral law is limited to the performative, narrative is ethics' "subversive 
accomplice." Narrative functions like a ''bridge between the law as such and any 
particular law applied in a specific familial, social, and historical situation" (38). And 
in Miller's literary investigations, narrative is the performative which attempts to 
''bridge the gap" between the material world of performatives and the 
metaphysically impenetrable "other." But narrative is a catachresis, a supplement 
for the metaphysical and epistemological void, so it must fail to "bridge," to "take 
the reader where he wants to be, face to face with the law" (25). The reader is left 
with a self-inflicted bridge to nowhere. Like the inevitable infinite deferment of 
promise, the reader is left with "unread ability," "a recognition of the fact that the 
text commits again and again the error it denounces" (34), namely a deferral of the 
promise to be "readable." Narrative is an infinite postponement of the ultimate 
direct confrontation with the metaphysical law itself, but, as Miller likes to point out, 
it's all we've got: 'Narrative, like analogy, is inserted into that blank place where the 
presumed purely conceptual language or philosophy fails or is missing" (24). It is, 
then, not so much a performative bridge over the chasm between the material and 
metaphysical world, as it is a sort of highly biodegradable landfill, inserted 
catachrestically into that point where metaphysical explanation necessarily fails. 
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Though Miller uses Kant's paradigm to extrapolate a theory of narrative, the 
important aspect of Kant's work is the fact that he denies the subject direct access to 
the universal law and, as a result, shows that it must be "respectfully" self-imposed. 
For Kant, the categorical imperative is a respect for the moral imperative. In 
contrast, Paul de Man and his emphasis on linguistic referentiality explores the 
notion that the categorical imperative is, in fact, a linguistic imperative. In his 
chapter on de Man, ''Reading Unreadability," Miller, with de Man's help, 
deconstructs the notion of reading itself by demonstrating the impossibility of 
penetrating the metaphysical content of ethics. In Allegories of Reading de Man 
claims that ethics is a necessary feature of human language, a linguistic and not 
metaphysical imperative, "a referential version of linguistic confusion" (45). Ethicity 
comes at the end a series of inevitable errors in reading as the imaginary referential 
of language, the metaphysical grounding which stops the infinite slide of meaning. 
Metaphysical grounding is paradoxically both the catalyst and the deactivator for 
reading and narrating, which, for de Man is always "the allegorical representation of 
the "impossibility of reading;" it is the story of an epistemological error of 
metaphorical naming (47). And yet it is impossible to read reading, so into this 
epistemological void is thrust (catachrestically) ethics. Epistemology is continually 
and necessarily undermined by the linguistic imperative for metaphysical 
grounding. But, as Miller points out, that linguistic imperative remains largely 
hidden because it is always already wielding its power: ''It's impossible to get 
9utside the limits of language by means of language" (59). De Man's paradigm of 
"unreadability" is a deconstruction of reading itself; indeed, reading as such 
becomes a particular moral imperative, which itself is a metaphysically ungrounded 
categorical imperative. Reading is the performative imperative to confront 
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unreadibility. Unreadability must, then, be more than a linguistic phenomenon 
because if it isn't, reading in and of itself would be free from ethical responsibility 
and bound by a preexistent moral imperative. 
H ethics are derived from neither a moral imperative ("respect") nor a 
linguistic imperative ("unreadability"), then the question remains as to how reading 
literature has an ethical dimension. In his chapter on George Eliot, I~eading 
Writing," Miller "reads" chapter 17 of Eliot's Adam Bede. Eliot's work is built around 
a metaphysical contradiction. On the one hand, it is consistent with Victorian 
realism, an obligation to reflect "exact truth" above all else, an avoidance of any 
degree of falsity, an obligation to mirror the world in a "one-to-one 
correspondence." Such an obligation, Eliot feels, is economic, ethical, and legal. On 
the other hand, Eliot wants to "make something happen in the pragmatic world of 
things and people," to alter her readers' moral perspective, and, in the case of Adam 
Bede, to "rename her ugly, stupid neighbors lovable" (81). Eliot wants to create 
human sympathy through a process of renaming. Such a renaming would imply 
that the novelist works solely with "referential, nonfigurative language, language 
validated by'its truth of correspondence to things as they are" (70). Yet language is 
always already figurative and the notion of "mirroring," for Miller, is spurious. 
Literal representation is antithetical to Miller's notion of the ethical performative. 
For realism to be performative, it must depend explicitly on figurative language and 
specifically on catachresis (73). He writes, l'This happening has no ~asis' other than 
the fictive, figurative, reevaluation performed by the catachrestic renaming one's 
ugly stupid, inconsistent neighbors as lovable" (74). There may be an ethical 
moment in Eliot's chapter, but it isn't, as she proposes, derived from a process of 
"renaming." 
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Eliot's literary paradox, which strives to be both constative and performative, 
is similiar to de Man's in that both widen the fissure between metaphysics and 
reality in their attempt to close it. In de Man's case, the fissure is widened by 
grounding the ethical moment in linguistic necessity. And in Eliot's case, the fissure 
is widened by grounding the ethical moment in thematic content. Both present 
impractical notions of the ethical moment in reading because both ground the 
ethical moment in a "predictable and measurable" structure. A solely performative 
paradigm for the ethical moment, on the other hand, is paradoxically both an 
epistemological and ontological response. Miller writes, 
All performatives are unpredictable and unmeasurable. A 
performative can never be controlled, defined, or have a 
decisive line put around its effects. The link between 
knowledge and power goes by way of language, and that link is 
both a barrier and a break, a gulf. Language used 
performatively makes something happen all right, but the link 
between knowing and doing can never be predicted exactly or 
understood perspicuously after the fact (76). 
The link between knowing and doing become~ less evasive in Miller's chapter 
on Trollope's mode of literary production, "Self Reading Self." As Trollope reveals in 
An Autobiography, his novels are derived from two seemingly contradictory 
impulses. On the one hand, Trollope understands his novels as effecting moral 
goodness in his readers by presenting "fictional characters on whom to model 
ourselves" (85). His goal is "to make the characters in his novels a medium of social 
communication, affirming and maintaining the values of that society" (87). Like 
Eliot's emphasis on renaming, Trollope emphasizes the importance of models and, 
again like Eliot, the moral imperative is derived from a constative representation of 
moral goodness. Yet, as An Autobiography reveals, the "morally-calculated" 
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characters are not calculated at all. Trollope describes himself as a childhood social 
outcast who was forced "play" in a world of fantasy which he retrospectively 
"transcribed" into novels. Miller describes Trollope's creative process as "auto-
affection" and "auto-fecundation in which Trollope impregnates himself with his 
own creations" (94). In a sort of "ethical fraud," his creative process is spontaneous, 
refractory, and lacks metaphysical grounding: "Moral decisions may therefore be an 
ungrounded act of self affection like Trollop's act of creating characters out of 
nothing but his unaided Imoral consciousness'" (97). This "unaided moral 
consciousness" becomes more and more unaided, more and more spontaneous, and 
more and more unground~d as Trollope writes from his subjective experience; yet, 
there is still a moral imperative in his novels. Like Eliot's, Trollope's desire to "do 
good" is determined by and separated from the moral law itself. The dangerous 
extrapolation from this mode of ethical production is that, like the text that produces 
them, the ethical act refers to some preconceived notion of moral goodness; they re-
present and defer to the moral law, and extricate themselves and the reader from 
moral responsibility. From this perspective, ethics are self-imposed, linguistic 
performatives, and the ethical moment, any metaphysical moment, it would seem, 
is "free" in its decision to be "responsible" to the metaphysical law. 
In his chapter on Henry James I~e-reading Re-vision," Miller explores this 
notion of freedom and responsibility. The evasive paradox James identifies is, 
where we seem more responsible we are bound by a necessity 
which makes us in fact irresponsible, while where we are most 
free, united, we are able to be more responsible, or are in fact, 
whether we will or not, responsible, since it is open to us to take 
responsibility or not (107). 
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yve are bound to take responsibility for freedom and free to deny responsibility for 
fidelity to the moral law. The grounded moral law, in other words, frees us from 
responsibility, but the grounded moral law is not ethical because, by definition, 
ethics must be derived from a freedom of choice. In Pygmalion Miller writes, "An 
ethical act must be free, free in the sense that I must be free to do it or not to do it, 
therefore taking responsibility" (15). This paradigm collapses Kant's idea of "respect 
for the law" by compounding the freedom of "respect" and the moral ground of the 
"law" into one ethical decision. The ethical decision is not a benign, predictable, and 
re-presentative act. It must be inaugural and productive; the ethical act is the result 
of an ethical compulsion which, in turn, drives other ethical compulsions. Miller 
writes, II All our doings, along with what their results cause to be done in their turn, 
form one indestructible web" (103). But the "doing" is always one step removed 
from the ethical moment and, as a result, must always be read retrospectively as a 
moral imperative. That is, reading "memorializes" the ethical moment into an 
ethical law; it is, as Miller describes a "preservative gathering or recollection" (105). 
Something is not "done" until it is put into words, but once it's put into words, it's 
no longer being done. ''Memorializing,'' however, is different from 
"representation" in its acknowledgment of ethical death. The ethical moment is 
inaugural but constructive only in its ability to surpass itself, to always be the 
catalyst for more inaugural ethical moments which, in turn, will be inevitably 
memorialized. 
Implicit in Kant's, Eliot's, and Trollope's paradigms is the notion that ethics 
are derived from an epistemological/ ontological dichotomy. If the reader can never 
face the law itself, she can observe or re-present the law as a re-naming or a 
characterization. The notion is that ontology is able to take over when 
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epistemology fails. For James, the always evasive moral law is neither the objective 
manifestation of the text nor the subjective surrogate of the reader. The 
metaphysical ground can not be re-presented as a performative, a character, or a 
referent, but it is also not an unattainable "other." Metaphysical ground is always 
transitory and instantaneous, always being re-grounded and is therefore always 
ungrounded. Seen from an epistemology/ontology dichotomy, metaphysics 
becomes the ground which stops the signifying slide of meaning. But for Miller, 
metaphysics too must be ungrounded, re-inagurative, and in a constant state of flux. 
In James's take on narrative, each reading comprises a completely new ethical 
moment, similar, but not identical, to the original reading in the writing of the text. 
The reader, constrained by the text, is free to re-invent it; she reads not to learn nor 
to confirm presupposition, but to continue the inauguration process: ''The value of 
reading, against all reason,lies in its difference and deviation from the text it 
purports to read" (118). As a narrative, the text functions like the memorialized 
ethical act, which itself is both constative and inaugural, constraining and freeing. 
Reading is the freedom to captivate oneself; it is "not of the text as such but of the 
thing that is latent and gathered within it as a force to determine in me a re-vision of 
what has been the latent law of the text I read" (120). Each reading is an example of 
the "productive force of the law," which itself is a reading of an example of the 
"productive force" of another law, and so on, each an inaugural act which 
necessitates other inaugural acts. Metaphysics, in its true etymological sense, 
becomes physics about physics, an act which explains other acts, always trying to 
elude the stasis of epistemology and the flux of ontology. 
In the last section of his James chapter, Miller identifies Walter Benjamin's 
notion of translation in ''Die Auggabe des Ubersetzers" as a metaphor for the 
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reading process. The difficult task of the translator, Benjamin writes, is not to 
resemble the meaning of the original but to '1ovingly and in detail incorporate the 
original's mode of signification" (124). The translator re-presents not the words but 
the original's failure to capture the "pure language," "an ultimate element beyond 
all information-quite close and yet infinitely remote, concealed or distinguishable, 
fragmented or powerful" (125). Similarly, the reading of a text is never the 
imperative translation of its epistemological characteristics, but the performative 
deferment of its parabolically-close mode of signification. The text is ultimately 
unreadable because "pure language" is metaphysically allusive, always oscillating 
between grounding and ungrounding, memorializing and inaugurating. 
In many ways, Miller diminishes the distinction between ontology and 
epistemology by asserting the importance of the linguistic performative and its 
corresponding continual inauguration of metaphysical categories. There is no 
transcendent or sublime moral law, only one which is inaugurated by the 
performative. And by making ethics performative rather than constative, Miller 
resituates responsibility. Under the rule of a preexisting moral imperative, the 
subject is freed of responsibility because she is "told" how to act. But when the 
moral imperative is actually a metaphysical imperative, the subject is responsible for 
generating the moral law. Thus ethics oscillates between imperative and 
performative, and, more importantly, between freedom and responsibility. Yet, 
paradoxically, the performative must also be constative if it is to be inaugural-it 
must inaugurate something. And as ethics' perpetual "subversive accomplice," 
narrative is itself performatively and constatively inaugural. Contrary to the 
structuralist notion that metaphysics is a category for understanding narrative, 
Miller identifies narrative as the performative/ constative inaugural arena for 
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imderstanding metaphysics. This allusive connection between metaphysics and 
narrative is explored in Versions of Pygmalion, Miller's "ethics of narrative." Rather 
than reading authors reading themselves as he does in Ethics, in Pygmalion Miller 
reads self-examining narrators, narrators who are themselves involved in the act of 
reading and whose reading allegorizes the difficult reading process the reader faces. 
As a preface to Pygmalion, Miller points out in Ethics that there is "a peculiar 
and unexpected relation between the affirmation of universal moral law and 
storytelling" (2). Paradigmatic of this relationship between ethics and storytelling is 
narration's reliance on prosopopoeia. In Pygmalion, Miller describes narration as an 
explicitly figurative category which depends heavily on prosopopoeia, the figurative 
trope which "ascribes to entities that are not really alive first of all a name, then a 
face, and finally a voice" (5). Author, narrator, and reader necessarily "do" 
prosopopoeia, the "inaugural trope of narration," as they narrate and re-narrate. 
Miller writes, "There is no storytelling without prosopopoeia, just as there is not 
access to the moral law without the intervention of some human figure" (212). This 
has important ethical considerations because author, narrator, and reader are 
always already "figuring" in their constant struggle with trying to escape figuration. 
Uke the inaugural ethical considerations implicit in reading, narration is an ethical 
performative for which author, narrator, and reader must take responsibility. And 
as with the ethics of reading, the ethics of narration presents an important 
metaphysical paradox, namely the performative/ constative dichotomy of 
inauguration. 
"Memorializing" serves as an important metaphor for Miller. In its literal 
sense, the memorial re-presents the dead; indeed, it is a specific brand of 
prosopopoeia. Miller explores the connection between memorial and narrative in 
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his chapter on James' What Maisie Knew, '~eading, Doing." Miller reads James' 
novel as a struggle to close the gap between what the narrator knows and what 
Maisie knows (47). As a prosopopoeia, Maisie's face is ascribed to the moral law, so 
any effort to uclose the gap" between the narrator and Maisie is an effort to "close 
the gap" between the narrator and the moral law. Yet Maisie herself is a figurative 
representation, a figure for remembering the moral law which could not be faced 
directly in the first place. The moral law must always be memorialized, 
remembered, figured retrospectively in a narrative. The gap between knowing and 
not knowing can never be closed, is figured as a narrative which is always already 
retrospective, and is neither epistemological nor constative in relation to the moral 
law it presumes to represent. Such narrative "failure" is roughly synonymous to de 
Man's notion of unreadability which must continually oscillate between success and 
failure: "Getting it right always means being forced to reenact once more the 
necessity of getting it wrong" (Ethics 53). And understanding Maisie as 
metaphorically symbolic of or meto~ymically contingent to the moral law is 
roughly analogous to Eliot's emphasis on renaming. Though memorializing is a 
renaming which reconstitutes the moral law, it also destroys it, puts the final nail in 
its metaphoric coffin. Miller writes, 
Just as any naming substitutes for the immediate presence of 
what is named and presupposes some form of unavailability, so 
personification kills just when it ascribes life. It presupposes the 
absence, inanimation, or death of what it resurrects (223). 
Of Maisie's narrative "death," Miller writes, 
At just the moment we most need to know what is going on in 
her mind, Maisie's subjectivity becomes a nonentity that no 
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longer exists as something or someone whose story can be told 
according to the narrative presuppositions operative here (72). 
A reader cannot accept not knowing what Maisie knew, so she must be figured in a 
story, refigured with a linguistic chisel, just as Pygmalion refigures Galatea from 
stone. Each layer or refiguration necessarily covers the previous, uses the previous 
as its grounded signified. Yet as each layer is pealed away, a forgotten layer of 
figuration is exposed. Figuration is a process which necessitates forgetting and 
refiguring. For Miller, this model has important moral implications: 'The question 
at the heart of the ethics of narrative is the question of how we can be held 
responsible for something we cannot remember" (240). Beyond the ethical themes 
of a text, the constative ethical elements, the author, narrator, and reader are 
responsible for the performative act of "personifying the inanimate." The reader 
must repeat in reading what the author does in writing and the narrator does in 
narrating: a perpetual act of figuring in order to dis-figure, always separated from 
the original creative act by layers of memorializing figures. As a literary trope, the 
memorial is a performative which, in turn, is itself a catachrestic representation of a 
moral imperative: "What the reader reaches by way of the text is not the text itself 
but that to which the text gives the reader access. This is that 'universal' of which all 
the texts figured symbols are allegorical expressions" (78). Reading is the 
"ineluctable necessity" to ascribe such a "universal" to a character's actions, to know 
what Maisie knew. 
What exactly, then, does narrative give us access to? Put another way, if 
ethics exist only as performatives, what ethical value could the performance of an 
always already memorializing figure such, as narrative have? In his chapter on 
Kleist's ''Der Findling," ''Just Reading," Miller exposes the "asymmetry" between 
the constative/ epistemological aspect of reading and the performative one. He 
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represents reading as a constant struggle against the stagnation of epistemology 
which it tends to.favor asymmetrically: 
Only for a brief moment, in a lightning flash, can there be a 
glimpse of what is originating about each act of reading, before 
some theory or other descends to put out the light. We must 
therefore return again and again to perform the act of reading 
itself, in order to try to catch that moment before it vanishes 
(96). 
If, as Kleist claims, ideas are formulated and articulated simultaneously, then each 
reading would be a re-performance of the original creative act, or, perhaps more 
accurately, a re-performance of what the reader formulates as the original creative 
act. Each reading must be perceived as a re-formulation and re-articulation of a 
preexistent order. As Miller points out, Kleist's work underscores the Jl1uman 
tendency to project personal agency and concatenation on what may be a random 
sequence" (137); reading is an lIunjustified imposition, not a triumphant seeing of 
what is really there" (139). A reading strives to make a text readable, but once it is 
readable, reading stops; readability is the static grounding antithesis of the dynamic 
process of reading. A text is always IIstrange," lIirredudble," and lIunexpected," but 
reading fits it into a tenacious causal chain; indeed, reading, narrative, and causality 
are unwaveringly simultaneous epistemological events. Narrative cannot not be 
causality: II A causal sequence is always an implicit narrative organized around the 
assumption that what comes later is caused by what comes before" (130). Miller 
writes, "There can be no experience, no event, no perception that does not include a 
spontaneous assignment of cause" (130). So in order to understand a narrative, 
readers must commit the same error the text itself commits, namely relying on 
narrative. 
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Miller's notion that reading is always an assertion of narrative causality places 
narrative firmly in the post-structuralist signifying chain of meaning. Meaning is 
imposed from an external point of reference, but importantly, it is imposed as a 
narrative. Narrative acts not like a bridge which leads to nowhere as is proposed 
above, but a bridge which necessitates the inauguration of other bridges, which 
themselves build other bridges, and which keeps the subject from falling into the 
abyss. In Ariadne Miller writes, "Narrative is the allegorizing along a temporal line 
the perpetual displacement from immediacy" (158). It is this "perpetual 
displacement from reality" which aligns narrative an9. ethics, or any metaphysical 
category, as "subversive accomplices." Ethics could not be represented without 
narrative, but narrative always memorializes ethics, always moves ethics from a 
performative to a constative state, always points allegorically to its inevitable 
unread ability, and, luckily, always leads to other narratives. 
In his chapter on Melville's "Bartelby the Scrivener," ''Who is He?," Miller 
uses Melville's narrator as the paradigmatic example the ''human tendency" 
towards narrative "closure." He writes, "The moral or message of 'Bartleby,' if 
there is one, seems to be the following: I cannot determine what my ethical 
obligation to my neighbor is, and then act on that obligation, unless I can identify 
him by telling his story" (142). Narrative is a prosopopoeia which tenaciously 
animates a "Bartelby construction" in order to bring him "into the space of 
immediate presence where [he] can be seen and known" (144). The narrator's 
disposition allegorizes the reader's-both must simultaneously assert a Bartleby 
story while denying another. For Bartelby to "fit" into a narrative, in other words, 
narrator and reader must select which textual elements are to be asserted and which 
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are to be forgotten. Narratives must be mutually exclusive, exercising "sovereign 
control over the others" (182). 
In his chapter on Blanchot's L' arret de mort, 'TIeath Mask," Miller focuses on a 
specific type of narrator who tells a specific type of story-the critic and her criticism. 
Current criticism, Miller claims, accounts for literary strangeness on the basis of 
society, individual psychology, or language. Miller lobbies for a fourth basis, what 
he calls a "disruptive energy:" 
This energy might be called religious, metaphysical, or 
ontological, but these works cannot be used here in a 
conventional way .... [T]he disruptive energy is 'ontology 
without ontology.' Nor is it to be defined as a species of 
negative theology (181). 
One might extend his claims to say that this mystical "disruptive energy" is 
narrative without narrative. Like Benjamin's notion of "pure language," this 
"disruptive energy" exists apart from our epistemological and/or causal capabilities; 
both are a "wandering of language in perpetual exile from a lost original language" 
(195). From this point of view, author, reader, and critic all participate in the same 
process of trying, but necessarily failing, to understand. All try to translate a 
narrative into other narrative terms, and "each is intitiatory, the bringer of unique 
thoughts, but each is also no more than secondary, a translation of the others" (208). 
Yet with the recognition of "disruptive energy," the reader is able to face the 
allegorical representation of the impossibility of reaching narrative origin. 
In his final chapter on James' "The Last of the Valerii," ''Facing It," Miller 
puns on the verb "to face." In one sense, we can never "face" the narrative origin, 
the "first prosopopoeia," or the transcendental signified because, like the categorical 
imperative, it is the unattainable "other." Miller writes, 'We do not comprehend 
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because neither that inaugural figure-nonfigure nor its material base was ever 
present as such to consciousness" (239). As a result, we ascribe catachrestically a 
"face" to it, which allows us to "face it" directly but figuratively. For Miller, this 
facing-defacing paradox is allegorized in "Last of the Valerii" and, it can be assumed, 
in all literary texts as the "undertext." A "good reader" recognizes such an 
"undertext," a allegorical text below the "manifest" / constative meaning of the text. 
There is always a tension between what a narrator says and what a text says, and 
this text/"undertext" dichotomy is an inevitable characteristic of narration which 
points to the inevitable failure of the narrative to face its origin directly. In an ethical 
framework, narrative is not the process of objectifying the ethical moment into an 
ethical imperative, but the ailegorization of this inevitability to memorialize. The 
narrative "gives a glimpse, through the cracks, of the inaugural creative posing that 
has already happened, the imposition of an initiating catachrestic prosopopoeia, the 
hiding of an aboriginal ignorance" (237). The narrative, then, is always an allegory 
of the impossibility of reaching a point of origin; indeed, even James' narrator who 
is "intelligent, perceptive, and ironic,. .. cannot be counted on to draw out the full 
implications of what he says" (217). By extension ail texts are about unreadability, 
allowing readers to comprehend only "incomprehensibility." As narrative "faces" 
one figure, it must always "deface" another. 
In both Ethics and Pygmalion Miller stresses that the ethical moment is an 
uncomfortable, ungrounded moment when ethics must be inaugurated 
independent of preexisting ethical codes. Further, it is a moment which is derived 
from a categorical imperative for ethical responsibility. Miller roughly equates the 
relationship between moral imperative and performative to that of signifier and 
signified. H the signifier cannot be grounded in the static signified, then ethical 
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imperatives are actually self-imposed, linguistic performatives. like narrative, 
reading is performative, a figurative translation corresponding freely and 
catachresitcally to an infinitely deferred meaning-just as a promise frees by binding 
infinitely. The categorical imperative is universal, but its ethical mode is 
performatively specific. As the reader performs the imperative, she defines the law 
which she can never have access to, can only understand its "significance." He 
writes, 
I am unable to know whether in the experience I am subject to a 
linguistic necessity or to an ontological one. Or, rather, I am 
unable to avoid making the linguistic mistake of responding to 
a necessity of language as if it had ontological force and 
authority (Ethics 127). 
The categorical imperative becomes Miller's "transcendental signified," his 
metaphysical ground which he asserts as a linguistically and ontologically 
unattainable "other." 
As I indicate in chapter 2, Miller is uncomfortable with the study of social, 
political and historical contexts as a "cause" or "mirror" of the text. This, he claims, 
is merely asserting a metaphor, a "similarity between the reflection and what is 
reflected" and are "displacements, substitutions, and crossings" which "require a 
linguistic or rhetorical analysis, a mastery of the varieties of figure inhabiting this 
region of linguistic transaction" (Ethics 7). Further to assume that the text is a 
metaphor for some reality is to assume that a text is entirely historical and 
constative, and, more importantly, that reading itself is not at all performative. 
Reading must be active and inaugural-it must somehow change the reader for it to 
be useful: "The ethical moment is genuinely productive and inaugural in its effects 
on history" (9). As a paradigmatic example of the metaphysics of reading, the 
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ethical moment is a response to the categorical imperative to respond rather than 
the thematics of a text. 
In his criticism beyond the "ethics project," Miller attempts to resolve the 
critical "double-blind" derived from an allegiance to close, rhetorical reading. 
Indeed the double-blind points to the "other" by way of the performative. The 
"other" is essentially a myth, a story which is itself a performative, a perpetually 
deferred promise. The "other" exists, paradoxically, only as a non-existent entity or 
plane, but it is vitally important to the existence of metaphysics. In a critical 
paradigm, the "text" can be generally understood as itself a metaphysical category 
which can be represented only in the guise of a performative. We must act "as if" it 
exists. In his close, rhetorical reading, Miller decenters the critical text from a 
metaphysical context to a rhetorical one in order to catch a glimpse of its 
metaphysical performatives. The reader must paradoxically deny the existence of 
~etaphysics in order to see how it exists-rhetorically. As a result, the study of 
literature remains a pragmatic study of philology which has "practical implications 
for our moral, social, and political lives" (3). By ungrounding metaphysical 
categories, deconstruction is criticized for making literature amoral, but Miller's 
"Ethics Project" reasserts the political, social, and ideological importance of literature 
and, by extension, literary studies. literature must be a "cause and not merely an 
effect" (5), must be performative rather than constative. 
Miller's "ethics project" questions how we can take responsibility for what 
happens when we read and what happens when we narrate if both are an 
anesthetizing supplement for our inability to face metaphysical categories. Miller is 
ambiguous about what he means by responsibility. Does he mean responsibility to 
the text? To the author? To the reader herself? To the academy? To language? To 
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social order? To universal order? Further, how can one "read" responsibly? What 
form would that take? Here too we reach a notorious double blind. Reading and 
responsibility are themselves metaphysical categories which we must define in the 
narratives we tell as we read, destined to assert each paradigm as a sovereign law. 
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THE READING OF CRITICISM 
To live is to read, or rather to commit again and again the 
failure to read which is the human lot. We are hard at work 
trying to fulfill the impossible task of reading from the moment 
we are born until the moment we die. We struggle to read 
from the moment we wake from the morning until the 
moment we fall asleep at night, and what are our dreams but 
more lessons in the pain of the impossibility of reading, or 
rather in the pain of having no way whatsoever of knowing 
whether or not we may have in our discursive wanderings and 
aberrencies stumbled by accident on the right reading? (Ethics 
59). 
Criticism as re-writing is truly ethical and affirmative, life-
giving, productive, inaugural. It is a response to a categorical 
imperative, a demand which perforates new channels, more 
adequate channels, in my writing, for the latent and gathered 
force to which I respond by way of the work I read. My writing 
as re-writing in its turn is performative, productive. If it has 
value at all it opens access for my readers and students not the 
meaning of the text as such, the information it conveys, but to 
the 'matter,' 'thing,' or 'force' latent in the work (Ethics 120). 
As I show in chapter 3, Miller's "ethics project" is especially concerned with 
taking responsibility for what happens when we read and narrate because both are 
inevitably inaugural (though Miller avoids pinpointing "responsibility" itself by 
staking it as an elusive and always inaugural metaphysical category.) But how does 
the notion of responsibility work in a critical framework? As the above epigraphs 
indicate, Miller understands reading and criticism as responses to a categorical 
imperative. Reading is a struggle to know "whether or not we may have in our 
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discursive wanderings and aberrencies stumbled by accident on the right reading;" 
similarly, criticism is a response to a "demand which perforates new channels,. . .for 
the latent and gathered force to which I respond by way of the work I read." Both 
express a responsibility to the text for a "right reading" in the former and a ''latent 
and gathered force" in the later. But, importantly, that responsibility to the text can 
be reached only by way of a particular "textual moment." That is, the text itself is a 
sort of metaphysical category which can never be confronted directly and is always 
mediated by one "reading" or another. What are the implications for criticism if all 
a critic can face is his or her own reading act? Is criticism merely a forum for 
subjective reader responses, independent of any textual constraints? And, perhaps 
most importantly, what good does criticism do for art? Does art depend in any way 
on criticism? 
Undoubtedly Miller struggles with the relationship between art and criticism 
throughout his career. On the one hand, he has a deep respect for the uncanny, 
''literary strangeness" ("for the law?"). He does not want to misrepresent literature 
as a constative genre or discount it as a benign means for transmitting preexistent 
metaphysical categories. He feels a responsibility to the "literary strangeness" of 
each literary text. On the other hand, Miller is a critic who wants criticism to be 
"ethical and affirmative, life-giving, productive, inaugural," and wants to somehow 
"allow access" to the '''matter', 'thing,' or 'force' latent in the work." He wants, in 
other words, to be responsible to the critical imperative, to come closer to the 
always ambiguous "'matter', 'thing,' or 'force.'" But the respect for, and 
responsibility to, "literary strangeness" and the critical imperative are themselves 
irreducible metaphysical categories. In his ethics project, Miller explores how 
metaphysical categories are inaugurated from reading and narrative; the "of" in 
55 
lIethics of reading" can be roughly translated to "derived from." Seen from a causal 
metaphor (undoubtedly inappropriately), the reading/narrative comes before the 
ethics. Ethics is a metaphor which supplements the IIpermanent displacement from 
[the] immediacy" of reading itself. As a paradigm for understanding how 
metaphysical categories (not just ethics) are derived from reading texts, Miller's 
lIethics project" offers post-structuralist insight into the nature of criticism itself: 
what it is, what it can and can't do, and how it can remain responsible and respectful 
to the artwork itself. Criticism, too, is a supplement for the reading process which 
we can never face directly. Thus my title ''The Reading of Criticism" refers not only 
to the fact that I will be reading Miller's criticism of Hawthorne's ''Minister's Black 
Veil" [MBV], but also to the fact that criticism itself is inaugural and derived from 
reading, which is itself a reading that can never be faced directly, ad infinitum. 
Perhaps the most interesting move Miller makes in his "ethics project" is to 
deconstruct reading, representing it as a category which is neither exclusively 
metaphysically constative nor performative, neither epistemological nor ontological. 
He diminishes the distinction between traditional opposing paradigms of reading to 
make it a metaphysical category in and of itself. Reading is never the same, is 
always inaugural, and, by extension, is constantly oscillating between constative and 
performative impulses. In the above epigraph, Miller points to a "failure" and a 
IIstruggle" to read; he portrays reading as the "impossible task," the fruitless 
confrontation with unreadability. Yet, understood as a metaphysical category, the 
struggle to read is no different from the struggle to act ethically. Both are overtly 
performative before they can be constative, always inaugurating and re-
inaugurating themselves. Further, like ethics, the categorical imperative to read 
cannot be a response to a preexistent notion of reading. For reading to be freely 
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responsible to the text, each reading act must re-inaugurate reading itself. Reading, 
in other words, should embrace its own epistemological/ constative futility: ''The act 
of reading is intrinsically interminable. It can therefore be terminated only 
arbitrarily. It can be stopped only by stopping, or by working out to its limit the 
implications of one line of interpretation" (''Ellipses of Interpretation" 92). Criticism, 
I propose, is a particular kind of reading: a reading of reading which faces two 
directions. It must be responsible to the critic's reading of the text, and it must also 
be a text to be read in and of itself; it is a simultaneously constative and 
performative enterprise which strives to come closer to and re-inagurate the process 
by which we come closer to the 'I/matter', 'thing,' or 'force'" latent in reading. 
As a reading of reading, a paradigmatic example of good criticism is 
necessarily elusive. It must represent what is latent in the act of reading while 
simultaneously being an act of reading; it pulls the reader in two antithetical 
directions. To pursue latency is to pursue the "productive illumination produced as 
one moves through various stages of reading," a process which he identifies as an 
oscillation between "elucidation and exposure of error ad infinitum" (Ethics 43). 
Latency cannot be articulated because, at the point of elucidation, it ceases to be 
latent. For criticism to be truly inaugural and performative, it must also be, 
paradoxically memorializing and constative. It must somehow diminish the 
distinctions between traditional binarily opposed critical paradigms: constative and 
performative, epistemological and ontological, explicit and latent. It's important to 
recognize that post-structuralism is not the opposite of structuralism because it is 
necessarily structural in addition to its unnamable opposite. In" A Guest in the 
House," Miller acknowledges his structuralist impulses: ''My own discourse is 
necessarily an example of the failure I was trying to identify. Had I succeeded I 
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would have failed" (189). A deconstructive critic is constantly oscillating between 
asserting and denying opposing paradigms by consistently asserting and denying 
the power of the critical text: ''If structuralism is an enterprise of mastery, 
deconstruction sees all analytical discourse as being invaded, contaminated, finally 
mastered by the illogic it would master" ("Guest" 190). What, then, is the form 
which can walk this paradoxical tightrope between hopelessly opposed polarities? 
What, in other words, does "illogic" look like? 
Undoubtedly, the categorical imperative to interpret resists illogic all the way 
down to the linguistic level. In his review of M. H. Abrahms' book Natural 
Supernaturalism, Miller writes: 
There would appear to be no escape from the prison of 
language except by way of a radical theory of fictions and of the 
interpretation of fictions, a theory which would recognize that 
'there are no "facts-in-themselves," for a sense must always be 
projected into them before there can be "facts"'" (11). 
The "prison of language" fosters the illusion that signifiers can be grounded in 
signifieds and fictions can be grounded in interpretations. The "radical theory of 
fictions" which Miller calls for in this 1972 article is not radical at all. As Miller 
demonstrates in Pygmalion, narrative is the "subversive accomplice" of metaphysics 
which, I argue, includes the metaphysical category of reading. As a reading of 
reading itself, criticism must be figured as a narrative which, like Ariadne's thread, is 
necessarily interactive with, but not grounding to, the text by becoming a text in and 
of itself. The critic's narrative is parabolically related to the text, "following its 
threads as they weave in and out, appearing and disappearing, crisscrossing with 
other threads" (''The Interpretation of Lord Jim" 211). That is, just as Kant's story 
points parabolically to the elusive metaphysical category of respect, criticism is a 
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story which points parabolically to the metaphysical category of reading. If the best 
readings are those which "repeat the text's failure to satisfy the mind's desire for 
logical order with a demonstrable base" e'E1lipses of Interpretation" 92), literary 
criticism is another kind of catachresis, a parable which hovers infinitely close to the 
"thing" latent in reading it, which cannot be itself faced. As a critical paradigm, 
narrative embraces unread ability as it struggles to read, always inaugurating 
another reading, which is itself another narrative line, repeating interminably the act 
of constative failure to avoid "premature closure." 
In Ethics, Miller points to the importance of storytelling as he looks at Kant's 
use of narrative in his parable about "respect." Indeed, philosophical texts are often 
excluded from the literary analysis Miller to which subjects Kant's. H. P. Rickman, in 
his highly critical essay ''Making a Mess of Kant," lambastes Miller's presupposition 
that "philosophy is a kind of literature and can be adequately analyzed from a 
purely literary point of view" (278) Rickman feels that Miller gets "sidetracked" and ' 
"misrepresents" Kant's conclusions (281). In defense of his deconstructive, 
rhetorical reading of Kant, Miller writes, "Since he [Kant] uses it [a parable] as a 
basic proof of one of his propositions about morals, the proposition cannot be 
detached from the example that is essential to making us understand it and 
persuading us to accept it" (''Rhetoric, Cultural Studies" 338). In another example, 
"Gleichnis in Nietzsche's Also Sprach Zarathustra," Miller pinpoints Nietzsche's 
reliance on parable to express the "most abysmal thought." Nietzsche must figure 
the story as a parable because it expresses that which cannot be directly named, a 
catachresis: "A fictional protagonist, modeled on no real historical original, and the 
literary form of parable, which gives in figure what could in no way be given 
literally, are both extended modes of the figure-no-figure called catachresis" (14). 
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The use of figurative language has important applications for texts across the 
humanities spectrum because it relies so heavily on it: "Figures of speech, choice of 
examples, and so on are just as important in a philosophical speech, as in a literary 
text" (''Rhetoric, Cultural Studies" 338). Yet, like the stories which he interprets, 
there is' no clear telos to his work, no governing theme, like his title "Adriane's 
Thread," for example, which refers not so much to any constative central theme but 
rather to the performative, labyrinthine motion of the text. 
In "Ariachne's Broken Woof," Miller concludes that narrative repetition fills 
the void of the impossibility of a single monological narrative line and asserts the 
permeation of bifold surfaces which are impossible to resolve. In reversing implicit 
hierarchies of the fully permeated dialogic, deconstructive narratives attempt "to 
define the monological, the logo centric, as a derived effect of the dialogical rather 
tha)) as the noble affirmation of which the dialogical is a disturbance, a secondary 
shadow in the originating light" (59). Criticism is itself a narrative repetition, a 
"secondary shadow" of the literary text's "originating light." As a "secondary 
shadow" of Hawthorne's "originating light," Miller's ''Defacing it: Hawthorne and 
History" is the story of Miller's difficulty in reading liThe Minister's Black Veil" 
[MBV] as a parabolic example of the impossibility of unveiling. He writes, ''In 
saying, 'Let me read for you ''The Minister's Black Veil,'" I make a promise, or I 
enter into a contract, an alliance, a vow of faithfulness to report to you whatever 
happens when I open my Hawthorne and begin to read the words on the page" 
(65). In his assessment of Miller's essay, Martin Schweizer points out that the 
position Miller assigns to art is as (with emphasis on simile) a bridge for the gap 
be~een "essence" and "appearance" which ''both opens the chasm, creates it or 
reveals it, and at the same time fills it up, covers it over by naming it, gives the 
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groundless a ground, the bottomless a bottom" (29). Miller's criticism, then, is 
riddled with paradoxes which continually and instantaneously reveal the "chasm" 
between history and literature, realism and allegory, veiling and unveiling, text and 
theory, and most importantly, metaphysics and the material world. It's the story 
which points parabolically to the "deconstructive moment" which disappears as 
soon as the human mind necessarily bridges the chasm. 
The essay itself is an example of how close, rhetorical reading is aligned with 
deconstruction by revealing how a text deconstructs itself. Central to Miller's 
project in his essay on MBV is his attempt to collapse the distinction between realism 
and allegory, and, by extension, literature and history. By exploring MBV's 
"attendant documents," he reveals just such a conflict to be central in Hawthorne's 
aesthetics at the time of MBV's production. Hawthorne saw his fundamental 
problem as a writer as "the irreconcilability of spiritual meaning and material 
embodiment" (56). Similarly, this conflict is central to the deconstructive critic's 
aesthetic. Namely, how does one relate texts to history, reveal intertextuality rather 
than mere textual implications? 
One of the claims which Miller continually makes is that authors are the best 
deconstructors. Miller's reading of MBV concludes that it is a sort of parabolic 
representation of post-structuralism: "It is the indirect, veiled expression of the 
impossibility of expressing anything verifiable at all in the parable except the 
impossibility of expressing anything verifiable" (97). If deconstruction exposes the 
ways texts simultaneously assert and deny themselves, then MBV and Miller's 
reading both assert and deny through a parabolic representation of unreadability. 
Like latency, readability is impossible to represent, so while both assert the 
"impossibility of expressing anything verifiable," they do just that by asserting a 
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narrative representation of it. In both, the constative/performative opposition is an 
opposition between parable/allegory on the one hand, and history/realism on the 
other; the former implies "figure" while the latter implies "mimetic representation." 
By subtitling his story as "a parable," Hawthorne invites the reader to consider it as 
one; yet, Hawthorne undermines this figural intention by using the footnoted, 
memorial reference to a pseudo-historical event, "Reverend Moody," to highlight 
that MBV turns history into parable (108). (Hawthorne's text reads, "In early life he 
[Reverend Moody] had accidentally killed a beloved friend; and from that day till 
the hour of his own death, he hid his face from men.") Hawthorne makes this 
opposition explicit and the reader is torn between reading the story as a parable in 
which she abstracts figurative meaning or a history to which she attaches a literal 
meaning. Miller's job as a critic is not to choose between parable or history. Rather, 
he must somehow give access to the paradoxical "matter, thing, or force" latent in 
their juxtaposition by oscillating between parable and history himself. 
In his essay, Miller investigates and collapses Hawthorne's seemingly binary 
opposition of realism/history and allegory/parable by showing that the distinction 
is grounded in the assumed existence of metaphysical grounding. According to 
Miller, the structuralist model separates historical from literary texts as the former 
transcends semiotic indeterminacy and the latter is subject to its figurative nature. 
Yet, as Miller reveals, both rely heavily on narrative; like literature, history is always 
already figurative, is always a re-reading, and is equally subject to the indeterminacy 
of language. Similarly, the division between realism and allegory is erased as "both 
are enigmatic and ultimately indecipherable narrative expressions of a strange kind 
of outside that can by no procedures of language be given an other than the 
enigmatic expression" (51). Because MBV deconstructs the opposition of history and 
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literature, it becomes a deconstructive parable, an " exemplification of an obscure 
conceptual meaning" (118). Similarly, because Miller's critical essay is a narrated 
historical event, his reading of it which points parabolically to the impossibility of 
reading it. 
As a deconstructive parable, MBV reveals the uncanny relationship between 
semiotics and subjectivity in which arbitrary signs, for example a face, become 
grounding signifiers for the unreadable subject. Reverend Hooper's veil 
deconstructs the literal version of this act of reading subjectivity, makes explicit the 
ways in which prosopopoeia veils subjectivity. He writes, "the wearing of the 
veil ... suspends two basic assumptions that make society possible: the assumption 
that a person's face is the sign of his selfhood and the accompanying presumption 
that his sign can in one way or another be read" (92). Miller explores the notion that 
by veiling the ''literal'' prosopopoeia of Reverend Hooper's face, Hawthorne calls 
into question the metaphorical prosopopoeia through which we presume access to 
all that is outside human. We give nature, God, or death a human face in order to 
give ourselves the illusion that we can have access to them, understand them, and 
appropriate them as the grounds of our social intercourse (95). These universal 
tropes which cease to be recognized as tropes become visible only when they are 
suspended by the presence of Reverend Hooper's mask. The minister's veil works 
to call prosopopoeia into question because it is explicitly a sign that signifies nothing 
"since its referent and its signification remain forever unverifiable" (96). 
As mentioned above, the critic must not veil that which is "strange" about a 
text. Miller identifies the absence of justification for the veil and the ambiguity of its 
meaning as the "major clue[sl for the right reading of the story" (67). He proceeds 
by identifying strange elements of the story and supposing how they were 
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intended. He asks questions like, 'The black veil is double-folded. That seems as if 
it ought to be significant, but what does it signify?" (67). And concludes from this 
and other questions that ''There is no way to tell for sure, though much depends on 
getting it right, just as there may be a severe penalty for getting it wrong" (68). 
Clearly, Miller employs an element of structuralism as he supposes that texts are 
intended to be read in a certain way, that there is a "right reading" of unreadability. 
His close, rhetorical reading often conflicts with his post-structuralist intentions; to 
conclude that there is no determinant meaning is, in fact, a structured, post-
structuralist conclusion. Yet there is a sense that the constative element of rhetorical 
interpretation is a necessary characteristic towards a deconstructive reading. like 
James' notion of freedom and responsibility, the critic must employ some 
grounding framework to acknowledge the freeplay of the text. In ''Hawthorne and 
History," Miller aligns the deferral of meaning with the apocalyptic undertones in 
the story, that the story acts as the veil itself, as an apocalyptic parable whose 
meaning is found only in the deferral of meaning. He describes this particular 
parable as "like apocalypse in promising such a revelation or illumination, while at 
the same time deferring it" (72). To free one's self entirely from structuralism, to 
embrace completely unread ability, and to confront the /lother" which the narrative 
points to parabolically would be to experience apocalypse of metaphysical 
categories: liTo cross over into parable would be to be in that unthinkable and 
unsayable realm where there is no longer any distinction between literal and 
parabolic language" (72). The infinitely-deferred promise must remain infinitely 
deferred. 
As mentioned in chapter 2, Miller is disappointed with the state of literary 
criticism and its emphasis on critical theories rather than close, rhetorical reading. In 
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IlJiawthorne and History," he responds to D.A. Miller whose interpretation of MBV 
identifies the veil as a metaphoric representation of 19th century sexual repression 
and secrecy. According to Hillis Miller, D.A. Miller asserts too much power over the 
text by l'knowing more than the text knows" (80). Hillis Millers reading is 
constative and performative in that he reveals how the text functions in, rather than 
how it is subject to, a historical context. He asserts that his reading of MBV calls 
attention to "the incommensurability of cause and effect in the social worldl and to 
the relation of this to the possibility of the impossibility of unveiling." By asserting 
authority over the text, D.A. Miller ascribes meaning to it which the text is capable of 
neither asserting nor denying. D.A. Miller brings a "historical Truth" to the text, 
which, not only does the text refuse to support, but is in its own right a narrative 
and subject to the same unread ability. Hillis Miller writes, l'To say the meaning of 
MBV is determined by its reference to the repression of sexuality in the American 
culture of Hawthorne's day is to be mystified by the ideology that Hawthorne 
unmasks" (88). Like Reverend Hoopers parishioners, D. A. Miller subjects the veil 
to constative and historical expectation. Sexual repression, or any repressed 
symbolic value, can never be unrepressed because it is always already figurative; the 
apocalyptic promise of the symbolic order must remain apocalyptic and definite 
meaning must remain suspended. By juxtaposing the material and ideological 
values of the veil, Hawthorne deconstructs the semiotic essence of it. It unmasks the 
way ideology masks itself. Rather than remaining in a state of constructive 
bafflement, in view of the "chasm" to which Heusseur refers, D.A. Miller and the 
citizens of Milford mask the veil with another veil, bridge the "chasm" by 
privileging context over text. 
65 
As Miller writes in Pygmalion, 'The relation of literature to history is a 
problem, not a solution" (33). To understand a text as a "reflection of its historical 
conditions" subverts reading by privileging context over text. With its emphasis on 
direct causality, D. A. Miller's critical paradigm is antithetical to reading. Again in 
Pygmalion Miller writes, 
A literary text does not merely reflect its historical conditions, in 
however complex or obscure a way. It also transforms those 
conditions, does something to them. A work of literature 
intervenes in history whenever it is read. Literature is 
productive, performative. It makes something happen (34). 
Even in his first work of criticism, Miller points to the performative nature of 
literature, understanding Dickens' work as not merely symptomatic of the 
consciousness of the age and the author, but rather as lithe very means by which a 
writer apprehends and, in some measure, creates himself" (viii). D. A. Miller's 
historical narrative veils the text with historical context and, by extension, defines 
reading as an application of historical factors. As D.A. Miller and the citizens of 
Milford show, it is the categorical imperative for hermeneutics which arbitrarily 
assigns some meaning to the veil, which assigns "something more verifiable behind 
the veil, makers] the veil type and symbol of something definite one can confront 
directly, face to face, through the veil, by means of the veil" (98). A reading, on the 
other hand, must be a parabolic demonstration of a text's unread ability, of its 
conviction to say "neither yes nor no to whatever hypotheses about it the reader 
proposes" (106). Reading must be an apocalyptic struggle, the deferral of the 
process to understand it. Hawthorne and Miller suspend this process by not 
allowing signification.to take place, by continually undermining any hypothesized 
meaning. Like the veil itself, the story is a sign that is not a sign, it is a tale which 
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hermeneutically signifies nothing, which is an "allegory in the reader's own situation 
in reading it" (105). Reading must acknowledge its status as "a perpetual wandering 
or displacement that can never be checked against anything except another sign" 
(97). And any reading of MBV must acknowledge that 'There is no way, in this life, 
once you have accepted the complex ideology of the veil, to get behind the veil to 
find out what is really going on back there, though this is what the ideology wants 
us to do" (99). To understand the veil as an allegory for the sexual repression of the 
19th century is to represent reading as understanding. D. A. Miller's interpretation 
arbitrarily stops reading by trying to make the latent "matter, thing, or force" 
explicit. 
Central to Miller's deconstructive reading of MBV is the sense that language 
is conceived of as semioticly self-referential, within a closed system of signs, and 
therefore that meaning is dearly different from, and opposed to, experience. By 
describing MBV as a parable, Miller's definition seems to be a definite statement of 
meaning, a literary grounding not unlike D. A. Miller's historical grounding. 
Specifically, Hillis Miller uses prosopopoeia as a "tool" for understanding the text. 
He personifies the text and, in the process, shows that "prosopopoeia is a 
fundamental feature of historical events as happenings" (124). As Hillis Miller 
admits, ''I have already committed the crime I am led by the story to condemn. I 
have made the mystified victim, once more, the piece of ideology I would 'unmask'" 
(123). But by making his reading itself a historical event, a self-conscious, figurative, 
narrative representation of a reading act, he keeps reading going, seeking a 
"gradual clarification," which briefly exposes the "chasm" which must always 
disappear. It's valuable in that it makes possible 
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new insights into what is going on in particular works, even 
where that has been insight into the necessary blindness of the 
work to its own incoherence or heterogeneity and insight into 
the consequent iriability of the critic to 'read' the work in any 
determinate or monological way (''Theory and Practice" 610). 
His representation of MBV as a parable of the impossibility of reading is convincing 
and, to a large degree, discourages opposing readings of it. But by acknowledging 
his reading as a failure t~ reach the "'matter,' 'thing,' or 'force' latent in the work," 
his essay brings the reader closer to it and re-inaugurates the process by which we 
strive to come closer to it. 
H literature and criticism are both parabolic representations of the 
impossibility of confronting the unattainable "matter, thing or force," what is the 
difference between them? In his 1965 article ''The Geneva Critics," Miller writes, 
consider literary criticism to be itself a form of literature. It is a 
form which takes as its theme not that experience of natural 
objects, other people, or supernatural realities about which the 
poet and novelist write, but those entities after they have been 
assimilated into the work of some author. Literary criticism is 
literature at a second degree. ("Geneva School" 305-6). 
Criticism and literature should be both performative and constative, should be both 
inaugural and productive, and should be an ultimately unreadable narrative. Yet as 
''literature at a second degree," criticism is a response to a categorical constative 
impulse, a fundamental hermeneutic motive to respond to a physical object, the text, 
in addition to metaphysical indeterminacy. Criticism is built around paradox-an 
objectified heterogeneity, an extra-linguistic text, not logocentric but coherent, 
containing the uncontainable. Literature, on the other hand, is a response solely to 
metaphysical indeterminacy which tries to free itself from any "materiality of 
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history." Literature is a perlocutionary speech act, a signifying chain which always 
IImeans" something other than what it constitutes. The '1inguistic turn" which 
semiology and post-structuralism have initiated in humanities allows deconstructive 
literary critics to champion rhetorical rather than grammatical reading, allows them 
to affirm lithe relay of figurative language in the 'construction of meaning' and the 
way it grants a performative as well as constative or cognitive dimension to 
language" (l08). He proclaims that "the most important methodological problem in 
humanistic studies now is to refine our understanding of the particular form of sign 
to sign connection involved in the relation of text to context" (l08). Literary 
theories, in other words, are only as helpful as their ability to walk the semiotic 
tightrope between constatives and performatives, and to assist, but not arbitrarily 
stop, reading, to be ''literature at the second degree./I 
The "theory" which people in the field of literary studies refer to is a slippery 
term. Does it formulate to a mode of production? Of criticism? Of reception? Or, 
on the other hand, is it meta-theoretical? Granted, readers must approach a text 
with a theoretical presupposition. "Theory" necessarily dictates the way we read, 
just as ethics dictate the way we act. It is by definition constative, but, for it to be 
truly useful, it must also be performative. Of the constative/performative 
dichotomy Miller writes, 
Insofar as theory is constative, its function is epistemological: to 
promote clear-seeing knowledge, as the etymology of the word 
'theory' suggests. Insofar as theory ha~ the performative face I 
have been recognizing in it, its function is to cooperate with 
reading or facilitate reading or in fact to be an act of reading 
that is a productive event in the real world of material history. 
The two aspects of theory cannot be reconciled, harmonized or 
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synthesized. They are not logically or dialectically opposed, but 
asymmetrical (Pygmalion 84-5). 
Theory, criticism, reading, or any metaphysical category is always a parable of 
metaphysical indeterminacy. Theory is necessarily metaphoric, the covering of 
strangeness with a dominating figure. Thus the proliferation of theory is at once 
constructive and destructive: 'The opposition between theory and practice is not 
that between metaphorical and literal language, but it is that between language, 
which is always figurative through and through, and no language-silent doing" 
(110). They are narratives of their own failure to read, but they must 
asymmetrically assert a particular reading, a temporary constative distraction from 
the task at hand: reading. 
In his "Presidential Address," he has much more to say about the misguided 
proliferation of literary theory, or the shift from the search for meaning to a 
determined metaphysics of meaning. Theory must not resist the reading upon 
which it depends, but "the triumph of theory is the resistance to reading, a 
resistance so successful as to be an erasure or forgetting of the material base in 
question" (288). Critics must resist the temptation to champion the metaphysical 
ground they inevitably seek, but instead must recognize it as the ground from 
which other readings can originate. Of the relationship between reading and theory 
Miller writes, 
There is no reading that is not theoretical, but the actual act of 
reading is always to some degree the disconformation of 
theory. The interaction between theory and reading might be 
defined as a constant infinitesimal calculus in which reading 
informs and alters theory, along with the other vital and 
inaugural effects it has (Pygmalion 94). 
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He advocates a paradoxical sort of open-mindedness where fruitless paradigm shift 
always keeps reading in a constant state of fluctuation between ground and 
unground, theory and practice, each presupposing the other as its "enabling 
ground." In uniting the two important impulses of literary studies, theory must be 
dynamic, continually made new, and necessarily derived from a reading. Theory 
should be "inaugural performative praxis," not an application of an established 
theory, but as a link in a chain to further understanding. The notion of 
"deconstructions" (as opposed to the singular) allows Miller to avoid stagnation. 
The real danger for deconstruction is that it would become a method, a verb, a kind 
of recipe where you'd sit down and say 1'm going to deconstruct the ''Prelude''''' 
(82). ''Deconstruction'' is not a verb; critics don't "deconstruct" what has not already 
been deconstructed by the unreadability of the text itself: "the great works of 
literature are likely to be ahead of their critics. They have anticipated explicitly any 
deconstruction the critic can achieve" (31). The critic's job is to identify the "act of 
deconstruction" which the text performs on itself. But such an act can only be 
approached indirectly through a narrative of unread ability. Miller's theory is, 
paradoxically, the denial of theory's ability to tell us anything useful: 
"Deconstruction does not promise liberation from that famous prison house of 
language, only a different way of living within it" (''Theory and Practice" 613). 
Thus, theory as such should be the antithesis of the reading act, yet, like the reading 
act, constantly fluctuating between construction and destruction. Reading points to 
the parabolic nature of any theoretical presupposition, necessarily always not quite 
reaching theoretical clarification, continually disallowing the structural impulses of 
theory, always a catachresis. Miller writes, "Research in the humanities always ends 
in a moment of postponement or deferral. It ends not with the sense of a goal or 
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research triumphantly research, but with the sense of a need for further talk and 
further research later on" (''Face to Face" 294). 
In the discomfort of metaphysical indeterminacy, theory has asserted 
literature as mimetic and referential to some extra-textual context. Readers and 
critics have declined to take responsibility for the '1iterary strangeness" and the 
"chasm" derived from the experience of unreadability. The primary responsibility, 
then, of the reader, teacher, or critic is to the text, a "response to the demand made 
by the words on the page, an ability ... to respond to what the words on the page say 
rather than to what we wish they said or came to the book expecting them to say" 
("Ethics of Reading" 190). The words "demand" to be read, misread, and rewritten. 
As a response to that "demand," criticism should try not to understand the text, but 
the "matter, force, or thing" which the text tries to understand. 
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CONCLUSION 
My contention is that the study of literature has a great deal to 
do with history, society, the self, but that relation is not a mater 
of thematic reflection within literature of these extralinguistic 
forces and facts; rather it is a matter of the way that the study of 
literature offers perhaps the best opportunity to identify the 
nature of language as it may affect what de Man calls 'the 
materiality of history' (Reading Narrative 81). 
The relationship between art and criticism is difficult to understand, but the 
shift from structuralism to post-structuralism has "redrawn" the "boundaries" of it. 
The notions that texts are infinitely heterogeneous, that literary and critical language 
is always already referential, and that art, criticism, and reading are metaphysical 
categories which exist performative1y and inauguratively places this relationship in a 
dynamic context. As representative of this shift, J. Hillis Miller's movement from 
phenomenology to "deconstructions" typifies the inaugurative force and intellectual 
vigor of this movement. But the study of literature must be more than an exercise 
in aesthetics; it must somehow be socially and/ or politically useful. 
The danger of post-structuralism is that it becomes a useless floundering in 
the epistemological void. And Miller's movement from focusing on the thematic 
elements to the rhetorical elements of a text can be interpreted as a New Critical 
aesthetic which looks at the text in contextual isolation. But if the study of literature 
is the study of language/rhetorics, it can help to reveal "just what the role of 
literature [and language] might be in society, in history, and in individual human 
life" (Ethics 125). Further, if we are constantly struggling to read, and if criticism is a 
forum for inaugurating the reading process, then it is an immensely practical and 
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ethical pursuit, one that each critic must take responsibility for. In reading, author 
and critic pursue the same unattainable, extra-linguistic "matter, thing, or force," 
both parabolic representations, signifiers referring only to other signifiers, and 
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